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New York

President:	Sir Mark Lyall Grant	(United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
Members:	Argentina	Mr. Oyarzábal
	Australia	Ms. King
	Azerbaijan	Mr. Mehdiyev
	China	Mr. Wang Min
	France	Mr. Bertoux
	Guatemala	Mr. Rosenthal
	Luxembourg	Mr. Maes
	Morocco	Mr. Loulichki
	Pakistan	Mr. Masood Khan
	Republic of Korea	Mr. Kim Sook
	Russian Federation	Mr. Iliichev
	Rwanda	Mr. Gasana
	Togo	Mr. Kadangha-Bariki
	United States of America	Mr. DeLaurentis

Agenda

United Nations peacekeeping operations

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The meeting was called to order at 10 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

United Nations peacekeeping operations

The President: Under rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations; Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, Force Commander of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Major General Leonard Ngondi, Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in Liberia; and Major General Muhammad Iqbal Asi, Force Commander of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire.

Under rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Major General Babacar Gaye, United Nations Military Adviser, to participate in this meeting.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

I now give the floor to Mr. Ladsous.

Mr. Ladsous (*spoke in French*): I promise to be very brief.

As the Council knows, this week gives us the chance to gather all of the military component Force Commanders of the Missions. All of the Generals are therefore present here today. In keeping with tradition, we thought it would be useful for them to meet with the Security Council for this interactive meeting. We therefore decided to request three Generals to give short briefings to the Security Council. Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, Force Commander of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, will share his thoughts on our efforts to use advanced technological military capacity to implement the tasks included in our mandates. Major General Leonard Ngondi, Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in Liberia, will speak about the evaluation within his Mission of predeployment training. And Major General Muhammad Iqbal Asi, Force Commander of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, will share his thoughts on how inter-mission cooperation could impact on crisis management by our Missions.

The President: I now give the floor to Lieutenant General Dos Santos Cruz.

Lieutenant General dos Santos Cruz: It is a pleasure and a privilege for me to be here today. The subject I will focus on is the use of advanced technology in peacekeeping and the associated benefits, not only to the Mission but to the United Nations and the Security Council at all levels.

This topic is of particular relevance to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) at this time as we prepare for the arrival of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). A very extensive selection process is being run by the Secretariat for a contractor to field and operate the complete UAV system. We hope to see its arrival in the Democratic Republic of the Congo very soon.

This capability will certainly help us in addressing some of the major tasks set out in our most recent mandate under resolution 2098 (2013). How will we use these assets? We will use the UAVs to identify armed groups headquarters, logistics hubs, troop movements, convoys, clandestine air strips and roadblocks; to obtain early warning of armed groups' movements and intentions; and to monitor camps for internally displaced persons. The ability to fly over sensitive areas for extended periods of hours and days will provide timely information. Those UAVs will help to deter hostile action by the armed groups and to trigger the use of rapid reaction forces.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there may be contingents from Portugal, Spain, Italy, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Poland in the same area — making it impossible to operate without very good information. I believe that information as key to the success of any mission.

I should not limit myself to discussing UAVs alone. There are other advanced military technologies that also have the potential to offer major benefits for United Nations peacekeeping. We are already using ground-based radar in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to provide better knowledge and awareness of activity on the Great Lakes. There is also the potential to make much greater use of surveillance technology to bolster monitoring capacity, as in the context of cross-

border activity. We have borders with many countries and more than 50 armed groups operating close to those borders, which they may cross, leading to broader disturbances. High-resolution imagery could be of significant use as material evidence. In a similar vein, the selective employment of signals intelligence could enable peacekeepers to stay one step ahead of those posing a threat to peace, which would undoubtedly help to mitigate the risks both to the population and to United Nations troops and personnel.

Other advanced military technologies that could deliver benefits in the Democratic Republic of the Congo include weapon-locating systems, boats, radar and acoustic technology. These are important because the rebels may use the territory of foreign countries as a base for fighting. That is something we need to know. We have scanners and forward-looking infrared systems in our helicopters and aircraft. We have GPS trackers in our vehicles. Small and mini unmanned aircraft systems are extremely important for tactical operations. We should also note that the adoption of other basic technologies, such as night-sights for weapons, both thermal and image-intensifying, man-portable surveillance radar and laser range-finders would confer excellent benefits. The problem is that we need more than advanced technology. At the moment, we need much more basic technology.

While pointing to the many potential benefits of the increased used of advanced military technology in United Nations peacekeeping, there are certain sensitivities and limitations that need to be recognized. The use of surveillance devices could be regarded as overly intrusive by host nations if not adequately controlled, including the information that is generated. Only unarmed UAVs will be used in MONUSCO.

Advanced technology also often requires skilled operators and analysis to support it. Such resources are often in scarce supply, particularly for the United Nations, which is heavily dependent on others for most of its military manpower. When we increase the technological resources in our mission, we need to adapt the structures we have. We need to have much more information. We need to have many more analysts. We need to have much more structure to deal with the intelligence. It is important to ensure that we can fully exploit the information and intelligence that are captured. If we do not link our structures to the new technology as it is adopted, the results are likely to be suboptimal.

I would like to highlight the fact that the benefits of this technology relate not only to the results they bring to the mission. They are important at all levels, especially with regard to the political conclusions made because the political analysts have real evidence of what is going on the ground.

In this brief address, I have pointed to some of the potential opportunities presented by advanced military technology for United Nations peacekeeping. No two United Nations peacekeeping missions are the same. While such technology might be good for one mission, it might not be as beneficial for another. Indeed, I have not discussed technologies that, while not suitable to MONUSCO, might suit other missions particularly well.

Technology has its limitations and will not always be the answer to our challenges. In MONUSCO, we will soon have a chance to see for ourselves what UAVs can do for peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It promises to be a very interesting and instructive period for us, and we will be keen to share our experiences as we proceed forward.

The President: I thank Lieutenant General Dos Santos Cruz very much for his statement.

I now give the floor to Major General Ngondi.

Major General Ngondi: It is a great honour to brief the Security Council on the need for an in-mission assessment of pre-deployment training of United Nations peacekeepers.

Troops selected for United Nations missions undergo pre-deployment training that is administered by the troop- contributing countries (TCCs), as part of national preparations. The main purpose of the pre-deployment training is to re-orientate the troops' operational capabilities to operate in a specific peacekeeping environment and situation. In addition, the pre-deployment training period is used to organize and equip troops in accordance with approved and agreed operational requirements, as well as to establish mechanisms for being able to self-sustain their contingent and/or contingent-owned equipment in the field.

The expectations are that troops deployed to a peacekeeping operation will be mission-capable in terms of knowledge, skills and attitudes; have the right equipment and enablers, as asked for in the statement of unit requirements by the Department of Peacekeeping

Operations; will be covered for reimbursement purposes by an agreed and signed memorandum of understanding; and are expected to have a high state of operational readiness which needs to be maintained and sustained by the force throughout its deployment period.

Prescribed induction-training and initial inspection of contingent-owned equipment are conducted when troops arrive in the mission area. This training focuses on individual skills, not the collective ones, and cannot therefore be relied upon to validate the entire pre-deployment training. While both the training and contingent-owned equipment inspections are valuable, there is no assurance of mission-capable sustainability.

Basic guidance documents and policies are available and continue to be produced to inform and steer the TCCs in training their contingents on mission-essential tasks to ensure that their troops have mission-capable capacities. The documents, including the generic TCC guidelines, also guide the TCCs on how to conduct an evaluation of the training activities undertaken. It is worth noting that, while the same documents are a considerable source of information for field commanders to ensure that their units conform to United Nations operational standards, the force headquarters does not have the means in the field to ascertain the same.

The aim of this short briefing is to highlight the need for an in-mission assessment of pre-deployment training and the TCCs' capability to self-sustain in accordance with the United Nations standard level of contingents' operational readiness, with a view to recommending the establishment of a mechanism within force headquarters that will undertake the same.

I am fully aware that the TCCs are responsible for pre-deployment training before deploying their contingents into the mission area. This training should be validated on arrival in the mission area in order to assure the force leadership of the contingents' operational readiness. Currently, force headquarters do not have the capacity to conduct the validation.

Capability gaps may be established during the in-mission assessment and require bridging or rectifying. However, bridging can be done only through in-mission training, and evaluation to ascertain the achievement of the training objectives is necessary. For this reason, force headquarters are required to have the capacity to formulate training plans and training objectives, and subsequently to evaluate the achievement of the same.

Over the years, it has been observed in the field that some contingents encounter numerous challenges in maintaining their equipment. Therefore there is a need to assess the contingents' sustainability procedures and policy to ensure that they meet the desired effectiveness and United Nations standards. Timely interventions on sustenance efforts will guarantee mission capability. Force headquarters do not have the capacity to evaluate the sustainability frameworks of the deployed contingents.

Every mission is unique and has its own challenges. There is a need to keep on analysing emerging trends and challenges with a view to developing viable intervention measures. Such measures include the formulation of training plans and training objectives and the conduct of training in order to impart the necessary skills. That function requires a suitable arrangement in the field. Additionally, force headquarters have several staff functions that make the entire force effective. Those functions also require monitoring and evaluation to ensure that the headquarters operates at an optimal level.

Owing to the aforesaid, I strongly recommend the establishment of an evaluation team within force headquarters that will assist the force leadership in sustaining mission-capable troops as well as a functional headquarters. The team would be invaluable in evaluating contingents and the force headquarters itself, and in drawing the attention of commanders to areas requiring their intervention.

Lastly, the evaluation team should comprise experts in all of the envisaged functional areas, which mainly encompass mission essential tasks, staff functions and sustainability. The team should be directly responsible to the force leadership with respect to monitoring, evaluating and sustaining the operational readiness of the entire force.

The President: I thank General Ngondi for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Major General Iqbal Asi.

Major General Iqbal Asi: I am greatly honoured to be here this morning, sharing my thoughts on how planned inter-mission cooperation can impact mission crisis management capability. During my discourse, I will briefly dilate upon the existing framework of

cooperation between the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), highlight opportunities for further cooperation, identify challenges and recommend a way forward.

Inter-mission cooperation optimizes the use of available assets for peacekeeping operations by facilitating, through pooling or the temporary redeployment of equipment and personnel in geographically contiguous missions on a short-term basis, as well as strategic gains. When unforeseen events threaten to destabilize a country, inter-mission cooperation can be an adaptive and effective response to help provide key assets in a timely and efficient manner.

The concept is not new, as initial efforts to stimulate it began as early as 2005 under the sponsorship of the United Nations Office for West Africa, headquartered in Dakar, Senegal. That regional office initiated the practice of convening regular meetings of Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) missions based in three West African countries, namely, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. Those meetings are considered to be pioneering efforts in that particular direction.

Today, there is greater need for coordination and cooperation among United Nations missions operating in geographic proximity. The current global economic environment necessitates a more efficient approach to United Nations peacekeeping operations. Although the concept has been practiced, and UNOCI has first-hand experience in benefiting from inter-mission cooperation, areas for further expansion exist.

I shall now identify the dividends of inter-mission cooperation accrued from the cooperative framework of UNOCI and UNMIL. The temporary redeployment of three infantry companies from UNMIL to UNOCI in late 2010 helped UNOCI to fill a critical shortage of personnel needed to protect Abidjan. In December 2011, one infantry company was temporarily redeployed from UNMIL to reinforce UNOCI during legislative elections in Cote d'Ivoire. That shifting of personnel within the region saved precious time, as well as the cost of bringing in troops during the crisis. The shifting of three armed and two military utility helicopters from UNMIL to UNOCI for the two elections just mentioned provided UNOCI with the mobility required to enhance monitoring of the sensitive areas surrounding the borders, as well as the ability to quickly respond to cross-border violence.

A number of reconnaissance sorties are being conducted on a required basis by UNMIL armed helicopters on both sides of the border. Recently, prior to regional and municipal elections in Côte d'Ivoire in April, regular reconnaissance and security sorties were flown along the border by UNMIL armed helicopters. Thus, the United Nations aerial platforms available in the region were optimally utilized and the show of force dissuaded the miscreants from acts of violence.

Another area of inter-mission cooperation is joint border surveillance. Under that framework, two operations, generally called "mirror patrolling", each of one week duration per month, are conducted on both sides of the border in selected areas. The practice enables the establishment of the United Nations footprint in remote border regions, which effectively deters border crossings of miscreants in large numbers.

Enhanced local cooperation at the tactical level is yet another area of cooperation with obvious benefits. I am referring to Operation Mayo, in which border meetings are held twice a month. Representatives of all components of the two missions, national law enforcement agencies and local administrative authorities participate in those meetings. They provide a forum for liaison, coordination, the exchange of information and review of progress on agreed action points.

Lastly, the ability to take counter measures in terms of intelligence-sharing is a valuable outcome of inter-mission cooperation. An effective intelligence sharing mechanism exists between UNOCI and UNMIL at the force headquarters, sector and unit levels. To cite a couple of examples among many, vital information provided by UNMIL made it possible to take counter-measures and thereby avert attacks against Blolequin and Guiglo in May 2012, and against Djouroutou in April.

Having indicated workable and constructive effects accrued from cooperation between UNOCI and UNMIL, I shall now identify a few areas where opportunities exist to further enhance such cooperation.

As a physical presence along and monitoring of an extended border is not possible, for obvious reasons, shared monitoring and surveillance of border areas through technological means is another achievable

field of cooperation. To compensate for a paucity of troops, technological means can be jointly employed by missions located in geographic proximity.

Rapid surge capability is another area of opportunity. The identification and earmarking of a quick reaction force based in one mission, but able to deploy to operate in neighbouring mission areas, need to be pursued. The earmarking of such a flexile force could have a considerable impact in crisis situations and provide a strong United Nations presence in areas where it otherwise has limited troop presence.

The establishment of a joint information and analysis centre is a possible field of cooperation. A centre could be established for UNOCI and UNMIL and fed through all internal and external resources to provide a clearer picture for decision-makers in order to achieve well-thought-out and informed decisions. It will improve the quality of information and assist in its speedy dissemination to all concerned. Such an arrangement would be beneficial for both missions, for better crisis management.

The successful execution of inter-mission cooperation has certain challenges, which I shall briefly highlight here. Legal and political constraints are a major challenge as the shifting of assets across national borders requires the prior approval of the host country and troop-contributing countries, which can be an organizational and administrative challenge. Invariably, it results in the delayed deployment of troops and assets.

The second challenge emanates from restrictive mission mandates. Protection, privileges, immunities, exemptions and facilities in missions, the respective status-of-forces agreements, as related to United Nations personnel and property, must be worked out in a timely manner with host countries in cases where United Nations personnel and material may required to deploy and operate.

The non-availability of standard means at the tactical level is also another impediment. The use of maps to share operational information — especially contiguous locations — becomes time-consuming due to lack of standard maps. Moreover, lack of standard communication means is another area of concern that needs to be addressed for coordinating important operational activities, such as patrolling along the border.

On the way forward for the future, I shall proffer certain recommendations.

First, DPKO should negotiate prior agreements between the United Nations and troop-contributing countries (TCCs) that allow TCC units to be utilized during reinforcing missions. That would ensure timely deployment of assets when needed.

Secondly, status-of-mission agreements, status-of forces-agreement, memorandums of understanding and rules of engagement should be worked out with the Governments concerned, providing legitimacy for crossing into neighbouring mission areas and facilitating cross-border operations in cooperation with the Office of Legal Affairs.

Thirdly, the commercial provision of some of the military capabilities required to make efficient use of technology to implement mandates in a cost-effective manner should be considered from a regional perspective. Such means would be made available on a cost-sharing basis among different missions.

Finally, the joint mapping of armed groups and criminality across the borders should be carried out by contiguous missions, which would prove useful to an effective response against miscreants. The availability of standard maps and communication means should be examined to facilitate cross-border operations and the sharing of operational information.

Inter-mission cooperation needs to be strengthened and expanded. Obviously, there is no one-size-fits-all solution, each mission being a unique case. But there are important opportunities and sometimes even compulsions to enhance cooperation and coordination among them, thereby maximizing available resources. Such cooperation is becoming increasingly important as a tool to ensure the optimal utilization of limited resources in an environment characterized by the regional nature of conflicts and fiscal considerations.

The President: I thank Major General Iqbal Asi for his briefing.

I should like to remind colleagues that this is an informal meeting, and its main value is the interactive questions and answers with the Force Commanders. So I would encourage Council members to keep their statements brief and to focus on questions for the three Force Commanders and Mr. Ladsous so that there will be time for them to respond to those at the end of the meeting.

I also remind colleagues of the three topics under discussion: the use of more technologically advanced military capabilities to fulfil mandates, in-mission assessments of pre-deployment training, and inter-mission cooperation.

I shall now give the floor to members of the Security Council.

Mr. Masood Khan (Pakistan): We thank the Force Commanders of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) — General Ngondi, General Dos Santos Cruz and General Iqbal Asi — for their briefings to the Council. The operational and logistical details shared by them today give us a glimpse into the realities on the ground and the challenges faced by peacekeepers. We pay tribute to the 111,000 brave men and women in various peacekeeping missions for their dedication and courage, as well as for their professionalism and service.

Today, we also remember all military, police and civilian peacekeepers who have laid down their lives in United Nations peacekeeping. The safety and security of peacekeepers and strengthened field security coverage are of paramount importance. Safety and security are the shared responsibility of this Council, the Secretariat, host countries, troop-contributing countries, police-contributing countries and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping.

For the past 53 years, Pakistan has been one of the largest troop contributors. Pakistan's participation in diverse peacekeeping missions is an affirmation of our abiding faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The briefings by the three Generals today demonstrate that United Nations-led peacekeeping controls violent conflicts, stabilizes post-conflict fragility, catalyses internal political processes and engages in peacebuilding. Peacekeeping has evolved with the changing nature of conflicts. Professionalism in peacekeeping ensures excellence in service delivery, as well as safety and security. In that context, pre-deployment training, including common and standardized training, is vital for all mission components. Different operational imperatives require scenario-based training and exercises during the course of active deployment. Such exercises are supplementary to pre-deployment training. The case for the in-mission assessment of pre-deployment training is therefore compelling.

In Pakistan, we have developed peacekeeping training modules that form part of the curriculums for mandatory courses required in career progression. We are willing to share our training programmes and experiences with the Secretariat and the United Nations membership.

In the recent past, two momentous decisions have been taken in peacekeeping. First, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Security Council has authorized "targeted offensive operations...in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner" (*resolution 2098 (2013), 12 (b)*) with the aim of neutralizing armed groups. Secondly, the use of unarmed, non-offensive, unmanned aerial vehicles has been authorized to support peacekeepers operating under the MONUSCO mandate. Both of those arrangements need to be monitored closely to ascertain their effectiveness. Positive and negative feedback, especially from Force Commanders, will help us with the refinement of the mandates and course correction. It will also enable us to address in inclusive inter-governmental settings some residual legal, operational, technical and financial questions.

In MONUSCO, we would particularly appreciate it the rules of engagement and concept of operation conformed to tasks identified in resolution 2098 (2013) for framework brigades and force intervention brigades. I request the Force Commander of MONUSCO to give us feedback about this arrangement and how it is working on the ground.

As current Chair of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, we plan to hold a meeting on the use of modern technology in peacekeeping missions next month. Today's briefing by General Dos Santos Cruz has provided useful input for our meeting.

We support the sharing of human and material resources between neighbouring missions on a case-by-case basis. In 2010, when the situation in Côte d'Ivoire deteriorated, Pakistani troops from UNMIL proceeded to assist UNOCI. Our internal processes for authorizing this movement were completed expeditiously. We did not delay the transfer of Pakistani troops despite serious logistical and operational constraints. Later events proved that reinforcement from UNMIL was

critical to the success of UNOCI operations during the crisis of 2010-2011.

Building on the insightful comments made by General Iqbal Assi, I will make three points on inter-mission cooperation.

First, inter-mission cooperation is an ad hoc arrangement to make up for deficiencies in the wake of a crisis. It is not a long-term solution.

Secondly, the question of the operational and administrative control of assets being transferred should be addressed up front. Each mission has its own dynamics that undergird the calculation of the costs of contingent-owned equipment. Moving to a different mission entails change in dynamics, thus warranting application of different financial modalities.

Thirdly, inter-mission cooperation is a contingency-based exercise, ideally restricted to infantry units and some enabling assets such as helicopters. Caution is therefore necessary in the transfer of engineering units and hospitals, which require more permanent measures.

I have a question for General Iqbal Asi. What are the most difficult and in fact intractable challenges and difficulties in the area of inter-mission cooperation?

I conclude my remarks by reiterating Pakistan's support to United Nations peacekeeping and to the noble cause upheld by the Blue Helmets all over the world.

Mr. Ilichev (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We thank the Force Commanders, Lieutenant General Dos Santos Cruz, Major General Ngondi and Major General Iqbal Asi, for their briefings on current issues of concern to peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire and United Nations peacekeeping overall.

Regarding cooperation between peacekeeping operations, it is our view that missions and the Secretariat must be fully prepared for any negative scenarios that may develop in the field, in particular with respect to the exchange of information between missions in the same region, the coordination of their activities and the movement of troops and equipment in case of emergency resource shortage. In this regard, we would like to express our appreciation to the troop-contributing countries, which flexibly and promptly agree to such movements.

However, although such interaction between peacekeeping operations in West Africa as a temporary mechanism for dealing with emergency problems has shown itself effective in a number of emergency situations, for example maintaining security during elections in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, it is vital to ensure that all United Nations peacekeeping operations have the necessary resources to discharge their mandates. From a political and operational standpoint, it is important to take into consideration all possible scenarios in countries where cooperating are missions deployed. Each peacekeeping operation should at any time be prepared to fulfil its mandate fully. There must be minimum threats to the security of the Blue Helmets. In the majority of cases, peacekeepers and equipment are being sent into the most tense and dangerous circumstances.

We need to approach the idea of standardizing cooperation between peacekeeping operations very carefully, especially in moving troops and equipment, bearing in mind the range of political, legal and financial considerations. Such questions must include the agreement of the country concerned to the change, even if it involves temporary configurations of the international presence, the peacekeepers being prepared to be moved, and United Nations administrative and budget procedures. Of major significance is Security Council agreement to the movement of personnel and resources.

Separately, we would like to talk about the challenges for the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). These are laid out in resolution 2098 (2013), which calls for the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region with a view to a political path towards a long-term settlement of the conflict and the establishment of peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region overall. We look forward to the full implementation of the provisions of that resolution, including that establishing the intervention brigade with the Mission.

In this context, we would like to inquire how the process for the deployment of the Brigade is going. How is it perceived as an instrument for achieving a qualitative turnaround in combating anti-Government units? An important United Nations peacekeeping innovation, which has been noted in MONUSCO, is the

use of unmanned aerial vehicles. It is still our view that this experimental process will require a careful analysis of all aspects of the implementation of new technologies a. J is not a carte blanche for similar steps in other missions. In this regard, we would like to know at what stage the deployment of the drones within MONUSCO is, and when the United Nations anticipates achieving their operational use. What is the perception of this question on the ground? Is there a risk that the drones could become an irritant, hindering the establishment of an atmosphere of trust among neighbours and even the very process of Congolese peacebuilding?

Ms. King (Australia): I too would like to welcome the Force Commanders here today and convey Australia's sincere appreciation to them and to the men and women with whom they serve for their dedication and commitment to the cause of international peace and security. I would like to thank them for their informative briefings. The three topics that they briefed us on today are all very relevant to the Council's ability to structure the mandates appropriately.

We are currently in a crucial period in the evolution of peacekeeping. The mandates entrusted to them are highly diverse and complex and increasingly span a broad range of political and strategic goals, encompassing not only traditional security functions but also stabilization and peacebuilding tasks. Therefore it is incumbent on the Council to engage very closely with those responsible for implementing those mandates on the ground and to ensure that our decisions are properly calibrated to the conditions that they face and that they have adequate tools and resources at their disposal. We agreed to do this as recently as January 2013 in resolution 2086 (2013), and it is important that we continue to hear the kind of feedback that we have heard from them today.

Much of the complexity of current peacekeeping operations arises, in our view, from the fact that many are now mandated to protect civilians, which is a necessary and defining element of modern peacekeeping, and the robust elements of recent mandates have been driven in large part by protection of civilians imperatives. The United Nations reputation and authority in the field now often depend on the capacity of the peacekeepers to effectively protect civilians. To deliver on those responsibilities effectively, the peacekeepers must have the appropriate training, skills, equipment and mobility, all of which are aspects that are relevant to the issues that have been raised this morning.

In the specific context of training, Australia has always been a strong supporter of the development of United Nations capability standards. We strongly support Under-Secretary-General Ladsous' recommendation that a director for the evaluation of field uniformed personnel be appointed, and we recognize General Ngondi's analysis that missions must be able to conduct in-mission assessments and pre-deployment training with a view to addressing gaps and, as he put it, delivering a high state of sustained operational readiness.

The security situation for most missions is not static. We know that. Therefore there should be in-mission capacity to identify force capability gaps as they emerge and to rectify them. Otherwise, it is hard to see how we can sustain standards and ensure that mission contingents are able to respond to evolving challenges, let alone crisis situations. Therefore, the establishment of an evaluation component within force headquarters is an interesting proposal and worthy of close consideration, in our view. I would welcome the views of the Force Commanders on the most common pre-deployment training gaps, identified once collective skills are assessed, realizing that there are two parts to that process once the troops are actually in-theatre, and their view on whether it is possible then to address those gaps once the troops are in-mission. It would be interesting to have some of their views on that.

I thank General Iqbal Asi for his remarks on the force multiplying benefits of inter-mission cooperation and asset sharing. The cooperation between the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire and the United Nations Mission in Liberia is best practice, it would seem. The Council rightly expects peacekeeping operations to respond to evolving threats and crises, but it is also rightly vigilant about efficiencies, and inter-mission cooperation can bridge some gaps by sharing key capabilities and providing surge capacity in times of crisis. He has also given us some compelling evidence of the benefits and challenges, and we would strongly support consideration of his recommendations, particularly given the fact that so many issues on the Council's agenda have cross-border and regional dimensions. In that context, I would be interested to hear his perspectives on the scope for further inter-mission cooperation in the context of efforts to stand up the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

The use of innovative technologies in support of peacekeeping is an operational necessity, in our view. National military planners prioritize this aspect, and we would advocate strongly for the use of technology to allow United Nations missions to achieve their tasks efficiently and at the same time enhance the safety of United Nations personnel and the people they are mandated to protect. We appreciate General Dos Santos Cruz's briefing on the benefits that he sees unmanned aerial vehicles delivering to MONUSCO. We also take his point on the importance of their being integrated very carefully into the overall objectives of the Mission. We would encourage the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to continue to identify the scope for the use of advanced technologies. Operational requirements should obviously be the overriding consideration, as General Dos Santos Cruz has said, but as long as we expect peacekeeping missions to perform increasingly complicated tasks, we should also encourage the use of technologies that enhance their capabilities to do so.

I thank you again, Sir, for the opportunity to hear from the Force Commanders. It is essential that we, the Council, the Member States — particularly troop-contributing countries — and the Secretariat engage in a continuous effort to adapt and innovate to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of peacekeeping operations, and this dialogue, in our view, is an important part of that.

Mr. Rosenthal (Guatemala) (*spoke in Spanish*): I would like to thank you for convening this meeting, Mr. President, and Under-Secretary-General Ladsous for introducing it. We are particularly grateful to the three Force Commanders for their enlightening briefings on three topics related to peacekeeping, and we warmly welcome all the Force Commanders here today. Their views should improve synergy between those on the ground and the Security Council.

Guatemala considers the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations to be of fundamental importance. They are an essential tool in the Organization's work, in which we have taken part as a troop-contributing county on the American continent, in Africa and in the Middle East. We value our participation in a task as noble as that of peacekeeping, which is also edifying for our own armed forces. From its beginnings to this day, United Nations peacekeeping forces have evolved both conceptually and operationally. The introduction of new technologies, as General Dos Santos Cruz mentioned, is only one example of that. The increasing number of complex operations in recent years has led to an ever-growing demand for resources and, with that, a series of unprecedented challenges. It is clear that in order to solve them we will have to rely on everyone's involvement and participation — the Security Council, the States Members of the United Nations and the Secretariat.

Guatemala contributes troops to the three missions about which we have been briefed today. We are very aware of the high quality of their Force Commanders and their commitment. Owing to time limitations, I will make only the following remarks and ask one question.

First, we emphasize again the importance of peacekeeping operations with mandates that are clear, practicable, verifiable and adapted to each individual case. The primary responsibility for establishing that condition falls to the Council.

Secondly, like many others, we demand results from mission Heads and the troops on the ground, but we must also stress that we have to provide them with the tools they need to do their work effectively and ensure their security. In that context, we should also deal with the issue of the large gaps that exist in the areas of capacities, resources and training, by improving coordination between the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretariat, as well as the troop-contributing countries.

Thirdly, we should point out the importance of giving the greatest possible priority to improving the security and protection of personnel deployed in the field, particularly in crisis situations or where we are dealing with a politically challenging environment. The clearest example of the importance of this point can be seen in the recent events involving the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force. For their part, host Governments must respect the basic principles of peacekeeping operations, with no exceptions.

Fourthly, as is well known, we still have reservations about the involvement of the United Nations in peace-enforcement operations — in other words, offensive activities — which raise serious questions. I am specifically referring to resolution 2098 (2013), adopted on 28 March, which includes a new approach in support of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The chief issue is about an accurate definition of the line that divides peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

Fifthly, we believe that cooperation between missions is important on a case-by-case basis, always assuming that the conditions on the ground and the mandates allow it. In that regard, and as was explained by General Iqbal Asi, we believe that the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire is a positive example that could help to clear up doubts about the timing, requirements, impact and implementation of such cooperation.

Finally, during the interactive part of ths meeting, we would like to hear from the Force Commanders their thoughts as to how we, the members of the Council, can do a better job of taking into account the opinions of personnel in the field and feedback from Force Commanders when we are renewing peacekeeping mission mandates.

Before I conclude, I would like to pay tribute to peacekeeping operations personnel, including from my own country, who have sacrificed their lives in service to United Nations peacekeeping missions.

Mr. Bertoux (France) (*spoke in French*): We welcome these now regular exchanges between peacekeeping representatives and the Security Council, one of the chief results of the Franco-British initiative of 2009. We thank the Force Commanders of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire for their briefings. Their vision for operations on the ground is essential to informing our thinking.

Peacekeeping operations are one of the emblematic United Nations activities. While their number and complexity is constantly growing, we continue to plead for strengthening military expertise, improving the Council's cooperation with troop- and police-contributing countries and for keeping a better grip on the cost of peacekeeping operations. We therefore support the guidelines of the High-level Working Group on Programme Criticality, which is trying to reconcile cost management with the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.

I would first like to recall France's commitment to strengthening United Nations peacekeeping capacities. France has about 1,000 men and women participating in seven of the 15 peacekeeping operations. Beyond our direct contribution, we are also deploying about 10,000 men and women in various external theatres of operations mandated by the Council and conducted or directed by the European Union, NATO or by us in our national capacity. We support the participation in peacekeeping operations of some African States through networks of national regional vocational schools, teaching technical and operational know-how adapted to the needs and personnel of African forces. We also participate alongside European partners in the EURORECAMP programme, where we first initiated the concept of African peacekeeping capacity-building in 1997.

I would now like to offer some reactions to the Force Commanders' briefings.

We support all initiatives designed to achieve the optimal instruction and regular training of contingents before or during their deployment. The changes of the past 10 years — the fight against impunity and, in some cases, mandates for peacekeeping operations on working to arrest people sought by the International Criminal Court in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali, the protection of civilians, special vigilance regarding sexual violence — all require adapted training.

We welcome the efforts of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to establish operational standards and provide troop-contributing countries with training manuals to allow them to deploy troops capable of accomplishing the ever-more-complex tasks given to peacekeeping operations. The recent example of the generic *United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual* gives troop-contributing countries a solid basis for providing more effective peacekeeping forces. I would like to stress in particular the importance of training contingents on human rights, as well as to take this opportunity to express our full support for the policies put forward by the Secretary-General in that regard, in particular the due diligence policy, which was taken into consideration by the Council in its establishment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

With regard to the use of modern technologies in peacekeeping operations, we welcome the experimental tactical use of surveillance drones that will soon begin in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). We await with great interest the Department of Peacekeeping Operations evaluation of this initial experimental phase in terms of the

potential future deployment of such technology in the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). These systems are excellent force multipliers that help to enhance the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations in the context of limited resources. Other avenues should also be explored, especially in the area of helicopters, where modern technologies can allow for fuel savings to be made and significantly improve flight safety.

Finally, when unexpected events threaten to destabilize a country, inter-mission cooperation, as the UNOCI Force Commander set out in his briefing, can be an adaptive and effective response to provide timely reinforcements in terms of troops and materials to missions in need. Such cooperation is a flexible mechanism, whose effectiveness has been proved in West Africa, between UNOCI and the United Nations Mission in Liberia; in East Africa, where MONUSCO helicopters can be temporarily deployed to UNMISS; and in the Middle East, where the rapid deployment of the United Nations Supervision Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic was possible only due to the logistics support of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and the redeployment of military observers, civilian personnel, equipment and vehicles from other Missions.

In that regard, I would like to ask the UNOCI Force Commander what specific steps have been taken within UNOCI to support the deployment of MINUSMA. This question takes up that posed by the representative of Australia. More broadly, what are the regional possibilities for ongoing cooperation between Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Mali for United Nations peacekeeping operations in West Africa?

In conclusion, I commend the commitment of peacekeepers of all nationalities, some of whom even pay with their lives for their dedication to peace. France pays tribute to them.

Mr. Oyarzábal (Argentina) (*spoke in Spanish*): At the outset, I would like to thank you, Sir, for having organized this dialogue. I also welcome the Force Commanders and thank them for their briefings and the dedication with which they carry out their tasks in their respective Missions, under such difficult circumstances.

We thoroughly support consultations such as today's meeting, which provide Security Council members with quality first-hand information on mission activities on the ground and the challenges they face. We trust that the holding of such meetings, which has now been ongoing for four years, will become established practice and continue in the future.

The maintenance of international peace and security continues to be among the highest priorities of the Organization. Peacekeeping operations are now a complex and continuously evolving system, developed to fulfil this fundamental aim. Argentina has therefore contributed troops and police since 1958, based on its commitment to developing such a system of peacekeeping and working to strengthen it and to make it more transparent and democratic in upholding international law.

As we always note in our statements on this topic, we believe that peacekeeping is a legitimate and valid tool to promote and protect human rights in those countries affected by conflict, in particular by providing assistance to rebuild institutions and strengthen democracy and the rule of law through multidimensional missions with increasingly complex and comprehensive mandates. Examples of this include the peacekeeping operations whose Force Commanders briefed us so informatively today: the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). The presence of those Missions is crucial to guaranteeing the protection of civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Côte d'Ivoire and to promoting the effective functioning of State institutions in Liberia. I shall take only a brief moment to make some additional comments and pose some questions so as to leave more time for the briefers to respond.

The first point I would like to raise is the clear linkage between the broadening mandates of peacekeeping missions, referred to as robust or effective, and the increasing number of security incidents. In that regard, during the negotiations on the relevant resolutions, we expressed our concern at the recent modifications in a number of mandates of missions in Africa, in particular the establishment in MONUSCO of an Intervention Brigade authorized to carry out peace enforcement activities. We know that the Secretariat has begun to implement additional security mechanisms for Mission personnel, as described at the recent meeting of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations.

Nevertheless, we would like to hear the impressions of the MONUSCO Force Commander on this topic.

The second question I would like to pose to the Force Commanders is related to the use of unarmed aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, whose deployment is already planned for MONUSCO and has been requested for UNOCI. Argentina supports the use of such technology as long as it is done in adherence to the principles of the Charter and of peacekeeping, on an exceptional and controlled basis, and only with the purpose of gathering information. In that regard, have some lessons already been learned from this phase of deployment of MONUSCO? What potential is there to extend the use of UAVs to other existing Missions?

We view as important the topic of inter-mission cooperation, including in terms of the use of new technologies, as long as savings made through such cooperation do not detract from the capacity of a cooperating mission to fulfil its mandate or guarantee the security of its personnel. On that point, I would like to hear from the Force Commanders if any lessons have been learned with regard to the command and control exercised by a Force Commander of over personnel of another mission who join his or her peacekeeping operation.

With regard to the challenges posed by predeployment evaluation, it is our understanding that the generalization of predeployment courses through which the United Nations can certify and insist on minimum standards guaranteeing a universal level of training could be crucial for attaining better results on the ground.

In conclusion, I would like to pose a specific question to one of the Missions to which my country contributes a large contingent and which is the only Mission in the Latin American and Caribbean region: the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Bearing in mind that it is among the Missions that have a large number of engineering companies, I would like to ask the MINUSTAH Force Commander, either directly or through Mr. Ladsous, how he would describe, from his experience and the results obtained, the strengths and weaknesses of the use of such companies and their impact on the humanitarian assistance being provided to the Haitian people. At the same time, I would like to hear his views on the use for the same functions of military engineering companies and civilian companies contracted by the United Nations.

Mr. Kandangha-Bariki (Togo) (*spoke in French*): At the outset, I would like to thank Mr. Hervé Ladsous and the four Generals who briefed us this morning. Togo, like the previous speakers, welcomes the holding of this fourth consecutive interactive meeting, which gives Council members the opportunity to receive up-to-date operational information from the various United Nations peacekeeping operations and on the difficulties they face.

My delegation pays a well-deserved tribute to the components of the peacekeeping missions, in particular to the soldiers of peace who, through their courage and at the price of their lives, work to keep, re-establish and maintain international peace and security. We also commend the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support for their ongoing efforts to further operationalize these missions in the context of the mandates that the Council has given them.

Given the difficulties currently faced by the various missions, my country believes that if they are to accomplish their respective mandates with greater effectiveness and to minimize negative performance, peacekeepers must have military training that meets international norms and standards, particularly those of the United Nations. There is no doubt that this imperative for quality requires a frank evaluation of the level of training and education of the different troops, which will require further pre-deployment training when circumstances require it. Given budgetary constraints, it is increasingly obvious that some peacekeeping operations are encountering difficulties in fully implementing their mandates because of their limited resources.

In order to remedy this situation, even if only slightly, Togo calls for strengthened cooperation among missions. Such cooperation is crucial and has the advantage of allowing us to optimize our use of available resources. For example, when unexpected events threaten to destabilize a country, or when precursor signs of resurgent conflict arise in some countries, this cooperation is an adapted and effective response that will promptly strengthen, in manpower and material, those missions that need it. This was the case when the intercommunal crisis erupted in Jonglei in December 2011 and January 2012, when the United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei provided the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan with substantial and needed assistance,

particularly logistical assistance. Such cooperation was also exhibited between the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the United Nations Mission in Liberia, particularly during the post-electoral crisis in Cote d'Ivoire. It is still ongoing, fortunately, in the monitoring of the Ivorian-Liberian border where armed rebel groups and mercenaries are at work.

We welcome the ongoing deployment of the Intervention Brigade, mandated to combat armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. We believe that, given the nature of its mandate, the Intervention Brigade should have the effective military matériel necessary to carry out its mandate. We therefore once again welcome the acquisition by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Congo of drones, whose basic job will be to monitor the movements of armed groups and to reveal them to the Brigade. They will also monitor and locate internally displaced persons in order to assist and protect them.

In conclusion I would like to ask a question. What is the status of cooperation between UNOCI and the defence and security forces of Côte d'Ivoire in fighting organized groups that are sowing insecurity throughout the country.

Mr. Maes (Luxembourg) (*spoke in French*): I thank you, Sir, for organizing this interactive meeting with the Force Commanders of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, Lieutenant General Dos Santos Cruz, Major General Ngondi and Major General Iqbal Asi. I also thank them for their detailed and comprehensive briefings today.

In resolution 2086 (2013), adopted under Pakistan's presidency recently, the Council noted that peacekeeping today ranges from traditional missions, chiefly monitoring ceasefires, to complex multidimensional operations tasked with peacebuilding and mitigating the deep-rooted causes of conflict. If they are to deal with this broad panoply of missions, it is essential that Force Commanders have professional staff with the required capacity and the necessary resources. Military staff must also be given pre-deployment training that is specific and adapted to their missions. Thanks to such training, we are able to mitigate risks and to improve the safety and security of Blue Helmets, and put them in a better position to discharge their increasingly complex mandates and to increase the security of those they are entrusted with protecting.

In order to assess if pre-deployment training responds to needs, we need in-theatre assessments, as noted by Major General Ngondi in his presentation. We also note the suggestion in his presentation that an assessment team be established at the level of chief of staff that could evaluate the training of Blue Helmets. In that respect, we feel it important that such teams benefit from the contribution of child protection advisers and women's protection advisers within peacekeeping missions. We also feel that it would be important to strengthen capacities at United Nations Headquarters, and we welcome the proposals for establishing an evaluation unit and a general inspectorate in this area.

With respect to the use of modern technologies, particularly surveillance drones, as was very well pointed out by General Dos Santos Cruz, it is important to improve our understanding of the situation in peacekeeping operations because such knowledge is an important part of risk-mitigation and helps to improve the security and safety of troops. This being the case, we feel that it is important that United Nations missions have recourse to such technology in order to have a greater understanding of the situation, enabling them to take the measures necessary with regard to security and protection.

In our view, by combining modern technologies for information collection, transmission and analysis with modern technology related to the use of non-lethal force, United Nations missions will be able to more effectively implement their mandates to protect civilians. In regard to the protection of civilians, I have a question for Lieutenant General Dos Santos Cruz. Are studies or experiments under way to make modern communication equipment available to local communities in high-rish areas in order to give those communities an early-warning system in case of an attack by armed groups? I am thinking particularly about the situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

I would now like to move on to inter-mission cooperation. Luxembourg is very much in favour of stepping up such cooperation to provide for a better management of resources. We feel that the optimal use of peacekeeping resources, be it through an ongoing regular exchange of information to take the regional dimension of a conflict into account, or through joint

temporary use of resources deployed in a given region, is most appropriate. However, it is clear that inter-mission cooperation cannot substitute for the provision of the resources necessary in fulfilling a mission's mandate. Rather than reducing the cost of a mission, the sole objective should be to increase its efficiency.

The example of UNMIL and UNOCI, as described in detail by General Muhammad Iqbal Asi, shows that inter-mission cooperation is useful, on a case-by-case basis, in providing timely assistance, in terms of staff and equipment, to missions that so require.

In that context, I have a specific question for General Iqbal Asi with regard to cooperation between UNOCI and UNMIL. The Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003), concerning Liberia, recently recommended the establishment of an UNMIL border control unit, aimed at strengthening cooperation with UNOCI and based on a shared strategy between the Governments of Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire on controlling the border. I would ask the General if he considers that recommendation appropriate, and whether it will be implemented in the near future.

More generally, with regard to West Africa overall, we welcome the efforts under way to strengthen inter-mission cooperation, including in the context of the establishment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

In conclusion, I would like to express the heartfelt thanks of the Luxembourg delegation for the commitment of all the Force Commanders of the various United Nations missions, including the committed staff who carry out crucial work to implement the Council's mandates, often in trying circumstances.

Mr. Mehdiyev (Azerbaijan): I would like to welcome the Force Commanders to this meeting of the Council and to thank them for presenting their insights on various aspects of peacekeeping. We underline the importance of such interaction with the heads of the military components of peacekeeping operations, which provides an opportunity for Council members to listen to their perspectives and exchange views on the current challenges confronted by peacekeepers in the field.

Matters related to the increased effectiveness of peacekeeping, as the flagship activity of the United Nations, and its conceptual and operational evolution, including on the military side, constantly require novel ideas. I would like to share some brief thoughts on certain issues raised in the presentations.

To start with Liberia, we note that the process of the gradual reconfiguration of the uniformed personnel of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), as authorized by resolution 2066 (2012), is being carried out against the backdrop of the country's continuously improving security situation. As the reconfiguration envisages a significant increase in police personnel, vis-à-vis a decrease in the military strength of the Mission, the issues of predeployment training and the subsequent in-mission assessment of formed police units become more relevant. Meanwhile, it is essential for the Government of Liberia to step up its efforts to establish sustainable and effective security forces, with a view to progressively assuming UNMIL's security functions.

As for Cote d'Ivoire, the case of inter-mission cooperation between the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and UNMIL has demonstrated that close coordination between missions operating in geographic proximity, especially on issues transcending the respective areas of deployment, is becoming more imperative in achieving efficient and cost-effective execution of the mandates. Increased cooperation between the two missions is essential to support the efforts of the Ivorian and Liberian authorities to effectively address cross-border threats and challenges and to stabilize the situation in the border areas between the two countries.

Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the comprehensive political process — under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region — is currently being accompanied by the strengthened offensive posture against illegal armed groups by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). The provision of unmanned aerial systems will significantly increase the Mission's surveillance capabilities, including for the purpose of observing the movement of armed groups, arms and related materiel, and will help in obtaining tactical information, which is critical to protecting civilians and ensuring the safety and security of peacekeepers.

The deployment of unmanned aerial systems to MONUSCO was agreed on a trial basis. In that

regard, we would be interested to hear the views of the briefers on what kind of political, logistical and operational challenges the use of that system — as part of inter-mission cooperation — may pose.

Finally, through the Force Commanders present at this meeting, I wish to pay homage to all of the men and women serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations, for their enormous sacrifices in order to advance global peace and security. Azerbaijan strongly condemns the recent spate of attacks against peacekeepers in some countries. We stress that there is no justification for such attacks whatsoever, and that the safety and security of all peacekeepers must be respected, guaranteed and ensured by all and under all circumstances.

Mr. Gasana (Rwanda): I especially want to thank Under-Secretary-General Hervé Ladsous; Lieutenant General Dos Santos Cruz, Force Commander of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Major General Leonard Ngondi, Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in Liberia; and Major General Muhammad Asi, Force Commander of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire; for their very informative briefings and their critical leadership at Headquarters and in the field.

I think it is very helpful to continue to have interactive discussions such as today's on a regular basis and to share lessons learned in order to better prepare for the challenges ahead. I have only a few comments and observations, as well as a few questions.

On the topic developed by the Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in Liberia, we support the need for in-mission assessments of predeployment training as being critical to efficiency.

Since its decision to join United Nations peacekeeping efforts, the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) have heavily invested in different training opportunities, especially predeployment and post-deployment training. The RDF holds training courses for contingent personnel prior to deployment, which focuses on enhancing their mastery of force and civilian protection peacekeeping policies and cross-cutting negotiation and communication skills, among others. Apart from generally recognized training, predeployment training needs to encompass mission-specific scenarios, while also taking into account and respecting specific national military doctrine. That being said, I would appreciate hearing details from General Ngondi on the criteria to be considered or used when assessing the deployment of troops.

On the point of inter-mission cooperation presented by the Force Commander of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, there is no doubt that such cooperation plays a critical role in mitigating and preventing the escalation of conflict, by timely intervention and the use of available resources of neighbouring missions. However, we must bear in mind that inter-mission cooperation is just a temporary, short-term solution that should not replace a permanent solution.

Turning to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council has authorized the deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which were supposed to be operational by July, on a trial basis. As it would be the first use of that technology in peacekeeping operations, the lessons learned in UAV efficiency, in terms of implementing the Mission's mandate, should inform future decisions on the use of drones in United Nations-mandated missions. Bearing that in mind, I would ask Lieutenant General Dos Santos Cruz, from his experience as MONUSCO Force Commander thus far, how optimistic he is with regard to the intended usefulness of the drones, given the dense jungle topography of the Democratic Republic of the Congo? In addition, what arrangement has he put in place to ensure that the information provided by the UAVs is properly handled for United Nations use, particularly when we all know that the operators are non-United Nations personnel.

Finally, there are various credible reports confirming the collaboration of the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo with the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda, a movement that committed genocide in Rwanda and is subject to United Nations sanctions. How does he see this situation impacting his mission, especially when the national army he is supporting is closely working with a negative group that he is mandated to neutralize and disarm?

I will end with a question for the panel as a whole. Given that they are commanding United Nations troops deployed in African countries, from their perspectives, what do they think the Security Council has not done or is not doing enough to end the cycle of conflicts

and violence in Africa? Any particular advice to the African members of the Council would help.

Mr. DeLaurentis (United States of America): I would like to thank the Force Commanders for their briefings. The United States places great value on the contribution that they and the men and women under their commands make every day to peace and stability in the countries where they serve. I thank them for their frankness in presenting the challenges and capacity gaps that can impede their ability to carry out the mandates that we on the Security Council have given them. Regular and open communication with our military and police leaders is necessary to help us match mandates to the realities on the ground.

We thank Major General Ngondi for his analysis of the question of in-mission assessment of pre-deployment training. There is currently no mechanism for assessing how well prepared troops are once they have actually deployed to the field. The United States supports the proposal currently under consideration for the appointment of a Director General whose office would, among other things, assist troop-contributing countries in reviewing their pre-deployment training regimes in order to determine how the United Nations or donors can provide better support to peacekeepers in the field. We strongly agree that training can play a key role in bolstering the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Developing effective training requires the evaluation of results and transparent conclusions that lead to change where necessary.

The United States is making every effort to improve the standards for evaluation of our own training assistance for both military and police. We encourage other Member States to take similar steps to foster performance improvements, and we ask that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) work with troop-contributing countries and Member States to provide training assistance so that together they can revise their training when needs dictate.

We would appreciate the General's thought on what type of gaps in essential skills and capacities he is seeing to help direct efforts to address these challenges. In that regard, we welcome the United Nations decision to proceed as quickly as possible to develop an additional 10 manuals for skill sets needed in peacekeeping. The United States is pleased to be able to support this essential project.

We would also like to draw attention to the recommendations of the Senior Advisory Group on rates of reimbursements and related issues, which were approved by the General Assembly last month. Those recommendations included the establishment of premiums for units that performed admirably under conditions of elevated risk, premiums for enabling capacities in high demand but short supply, and incentives for units to deploy with and maintain the capabilities required to perform their assigned tasks. We welcome that outcome and believe that it provides an opportunity to enhance the ability of missions to achieve their mandates.

We thank Lieutenant General Dos Santos Cruz for his remarks on leveraging advanced technology in United Nations peacekeeping missions. The United States supports the use of new technologies to help improve mission security and facilitate mandated tasks, such as the protection of civilians. We look forward to learning from the experience of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo's (MONUSCO) how these technologies can best be incorporated by DPKO and the Department of Field Support, where appropriate, and whether MONUSCO has the personnel and equipment necessary to rapidly assess the information from unarmed, unmanned aerial systems and transmit it to subordinate units in a timely fashion.

We thank Major General Iqbal Asi for his briefing on how inter-mission cooperation and the sharing of assets can effect missions' crisis management. The current fiscal crisis and the shortage of enabling forces, such as helicopters and the proximity of several peacekeeping missions in Africa, make inter-mission cooperation more important than ever before. It is our impression that the cooperation between the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire has worked well on the whole. We would welcome any other recommendations he would have for Force Commanders in contingents in other United Nations peacekeeping operations on best practices for coordination. I think that a number of other delegations have asked for a similar assessment.

Finally, this Council asks the Force Commanders and their troops to operate often in dangerous and difficult environments. I would ask all Force Commanders to please share our sincere gratitude to the servicemen and servicewomen at the missions who

are working day and night to bring peace and security to vulnerable populations.

Mr. Kim Sook (Republic of Korea): I thank Under-Secretary-General Hervé Ladsous and the three Force Commanders for their briefings.

United Nations peacekeeping has evolved throughout its history, overcoming new challenges that have arisen from time to time. As resolution 2086 (2013) epitomizes, a multidimensional approach is increasingly important. There is also growing recognition of the need for a more robust mandate. The Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali offer the most recent evidence of that evolution. There are also cases like that of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, where a typical mission with a traditional mandate has to adapt itself to a harshly changing environment.

The changing environment of United Nations peacekeeping operations may raise challenges for the Force Commanders on the ground. Against that backdrop, my delegation salutes all heads of military components here today and everyone under their command for their professionalism, dedication and courage. In order to ensure the efficient implementation of peacekeeping mandates, the capabilities of missions should be enhanced with strategic insight, utilizing all available means, including troop enforcement, the application of modern technology and inter-mission cooperation.

I would like to comment on two points. First, inter-mission cooperation is useful in its nature as a short-term stopgap measure. Nonetheless, the transition of troops between missions cannot be considered lightly and should be dealt with very cautiously because it requires the consent of the relevant parties, including the troop-contributing countries. Even the successful case of inter-mission cooperation between the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire and United Nations Mission in Liberia, which Major General Iqbal Asi elaborated on today, did not include major troop transitions, but mainly the movement of equipment such as helicopters.

Secondly, with regard to modern technology, my delegation supports its application to peacekeeping as a matter of principle. We are well aware that new undertakings always entail new questions. However, we believe that the development of technology will strengthen efficiency and reduce the cost of our future activities, as it has in the past. It was in that vein that we supported the Secretary-General's recommendation to enhance the operational mobility and surveillance capability of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The adoption of new technologies for peacekeeping is likely to bring about new tasks for the Secretariat. We expect the Secretariat to exert extra efforts in this regard, to cooperate with the troop-contributing countries that have the ability and willingness to provide technology. Also, the political and legal implications for introducing technology need to be fully and further analysed.

In terms of the presentation by General Dos Santos Cruz on the adoption of advanced military technology in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I have a similar question for the Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. In places such as Darfur or Jonglei, the technological improvement of the Mission's intelligence capability could greatly contribute to the protection of troops and the implementation of their mandate. The question I would appreciate answered is whether a sufficient level of intelligence is available for his decision-making. Does he find any specific limitations on the Mission's capabilities?

In conclusion, today's briefing reminded us all that the responsibility of the Security Council lies not only in giving tasks to field missions, but also in ensuring that they are provided with sufficient capabilities. May we all be equal to the task.

Mr. Wang Min (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Ladsous and the three Force Commanders for their respective briefings.

United Nations peacekeeping operations, as an important means for maintaining international peace and consolidating collective security, have made important contributions to resolving conflicts and disputes and restoring and rebuilding peace. In the process, they have gained the trust and support of Member States. United Nations peacekeepers carry out their tasks in difficult, complex and dangerous conditions, overcome various difficulties to discharge their mandate and have brought peace and hope to the peoples of areas in conflict. They are the embodiment of faithfulness, dedication and sacrifice. I would like to pay tribute to the Force Commanders here today

and, through them, to all United Nations peacekeeping personnel.

The current international situation is undergoing complex changes. New elements have emerged in conflict situations. The threats and challenges to international peace and security have become more diverse. In order to adapt to changing needs, United Nations peacekeeping operations have been the subject of constant reforms and adjustments. At the same time, against the backdrop of expanding operations and growing complexity in mandates, the issues of how to ensure that the mandates of peacekeeping operations are more targeted and operational, enhance the management of peacekeeping operations and ensure that their mandates achieve the expected results have become issues that we need to urgently address. In response to the briefings we have just heard, I would like to make the following four comments.

First, we must adhere to Dag Hammarskjöld's three principles for the smooth conduct of peacekeeping operations. Deviation from or dilution of the basic peacekeeping principles will jeopardize the presumed objectivity and impartiality of peacekeeping operations and may even create a situation where the United Nations becomes a party to a conflict, hence hampering international efforts to resolve it. Peacekeeping operations, in the discharge of their mandate, should fully respect the sovereignty of the host countries, strengthen coordination with the parties concerned and work to win the trust, understanding and support of host countries.

Secondly, peacekeeping operations should create favourable conditions for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and work with and support the political process. Only through political dialogue, resolving differences through consultation and achieving national reconciliation will it be possible to effectively eliminate conflict. The success of peacekeeping operations must rely on a clear political process and a complete set of strategies on security, stability and peacebuilding. Peacekeeping operations must strictly abide by the Council's mandate and play the role of agent and mediator in the political process and process of national reconciliation in the host country.

Thirdly, adequate resources are an important element for the effective discharge of peacekeeping operations' mandates. The Department of Field Support should continue to improve the level of logistics services it provides to missions to enhance efficiency in the disbursement and utilization of logistical resources and to provide effective and timely support to missions. We support the idea that countries with high technical and equipment capacity should actively participate in peacekeeping operations so as to make a useful contribution to enhancing the overall capability and equipment of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

Fourthly, enhancing the level of management and strengthening internal coordination are effective means to enhance the efficiency of peacekeeping operations. We support stronger communication and coordination between United Nations Headquarters and missions, on the one hand, and the various departments within a mission, on the other, so as to ensure that there is an effective system of command and control. Missions may carry out inter-mission cooperation based on their mandates and make rational use of resources and assets.

Attacks against peacekeeping operations and personnel have caused grave loss to troop-contributing countries and United Nations peacekeeping operations. The United Nations should deal with this matter as a matter of urgency and enhance measures for the protection and security of United Nations peacekeepers.

China is a firm supporter and active participant in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Chinese peacekeepers have made an important contribution to maintaining international peace and security through their own actions, from South Sudan to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and from the Middle East to Cyprus. More 1,600 Chinese peacekeepers are deployed in nine mission areas in the service to peace. China is prepared to continue to support and participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations and, together with the international community, to promote the cause of peacekeeping and make a greater contribution to maintaining international peace and security.

Mr. Loulichki (Morocco) (*spoke in French*): My country is pleased with this new opportunity to hold a dialogue and interact with United Nations Force Commanders from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia. This opportunity is a continuation of a good practice, one that allows us to move forward in our thinking on more effective and better management of peacekeeping operations and how to better use the resources available. We would like to thank Mr. Ladsous and the three Force Commanders for their respective briefings and for having shared with

us their thinking and their perspectives based on their experience on the ground.

Peacekeeping operations today represent, as my colleagues have said, one of the most important and valuable tools available for collective United Nations action for peacekeeping and international security, and they allow us to save millions of lives. In recent years, multidimensional peacekeeping operations have encountered increasing challenges. Faced with that fact, it is clear that adaptation is necessary in order to ensure that the capacity of peacekeeping operations is able to respond to the increasingly complex tasks mandated to them by the Council, and so that they can function more effectively in the political, security and climatic environments where they are called on to deploy.

The format of meetings like today's enables us to better understand realities on the ground and to see the point of view of those who are permanently in touch with those realities and whose job it is to carry out the mandates that we discuss and that are adopted by the Council. It is important to have their perceptions on how to make peacekeeping operations as effective and efficient as possible. The three Force Commanders and Mr. Ladsous raised three very pertinent points today concerning training, new technologies and inter-mission cooperation. My delegation would like to comment specifically on those three points.

First, the issue of training is extremely important and a crucial factor in the successful conduct of every mission. We believe it is helpful to draw on the expertise of the major troop contributors, who have accumulated considerable experience during their service in multiple peacekeeping operations. In that context, the effectiveness of cooperation between emerging contributing countries and those that possess know-how and expertise has been widely demonstrated. It is time to make that practice routine.

Turning now to inter-mission cooperation, my country has always supported this approach, with its proven usefulness on the ground whether in a crisis or when a new peacekeeping operation is being set up. Inter-mission cooperation also has many advantages in dealing with optimizing resources and filling logistical gaps in crisis situations. Indeed, it has demonstrated its effectiveness in the past few years, particularly in the Mano River area, between the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire and the United Nations Mission in Liberia, as we were able to see during the Security Council's visit to West Africa.

Our belief in the growing usefulness of that approach encouraged us during Morocco's presidency of the Council in December to organize a debate specifically on the subject (see S/PV.6886). That debate enabled us to highlight the potential of this type of cooperation and identify the difficulties to be overcome. It also emerged that this tool should not be seen as a lasting solution to a number of the structural problems that undermine the effectiveness of peacekeeping. It also underlined the importance of supplying all the various United Nations missions with the human, logistical and technical means they need to carry out their respective tasks adequately.

The subject of the use of new technology in peacekeeping operations deserves greater reflection. Yesterday, we heard Mr. Ladsous and Ms. Ameerah Haq's discussion (see S/PV.6985) of the new security and logistical challenges facing the forthcoming United Nations mission in Mali, owing to climatic conditions that require innovative approaches and the use of new technologies to ensure peacekeeping operations do not deplete the water table. However, it was explained that some technologies do not work, owing to extreme temperatures requiring the use of more basic communication methods. All of which shows how important it is to continue reflecting on how to use those new technologies, and to arrive at a consensus on the subject at the level of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in order to clarify every aspect of their use.

The success of peacekeeping operations rests on crucial interdependent factors such as realistic mandates, triangular cooperation between the Secretariat, the troop-contributing countries and the executive department in planning both the implementation of those mandates and genuine exit strategies along with measures ensuring sustainable development. Morocco stresses again the importance of full respect for peacekeeping operations mandates and the basic principles that govern them — that is, the consent of the parties, the non-use of force except in legitimate self-defence and impartiality.

Finally, Morocco is a traditional contributor to United Nations peacekeeping operations in terms of troops but also of training and humanitarian assistance. We therefore remain committed to our peacekeeping

and peacebuilding missions. In conclusion, I would like to pay tribute once again to all the men and women who have paid with their lives for their dedication to the cause of peace, while calling on the United Nations to continue to strengthen the measures that will ensure greater security for its peacekeeping troops.

The President: I shall now make some remarks in my capacity as representative of the United Kingdom.

Like my colleagues, I would like to thank the three Force Commanders for their very informative briefings this morning. We see this as one of the most important sessions the Security Council has, since it is critical that we hear directly from the field before establishing and renewing mandates for peacekeeping forces around the world. I might also add that with the use of video technology, one of the advantages we see in having video-teleconferencing (VTC) with Special Representatives, as we do occasionally, is that they sometimes enable the Force Commanders to be present and sitting alongside them and can thus actually give the Security Council direct advice. I hope that will become normal practice when we have our briefings and consultations via VTC.

I would also like to acknowledge the presence of Lieutenant General Gaye and thank him for his sterling leadership of the Office of Military Affairs and for his sage advice to the Security Council over the past three years. We wish him well in his new position in the field. I would also like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to those engaged in what my Pakistani colleague rightly called the noble cause of peacekeeping, and to recall and acknowledge their many sacrifices in making our world a safer place.

Turning to the briefings, I do have some questions for the three Force Commanders. General Dos Santos Cruz made a compelling case for the use of advanced military technology in United Nations peacekeeping, including unmanned aerial systems (UAS). I know a lot of people were asking about the General's experience with it; my understanding is that the system is not yet deployed, so it is obviously too early to respond as to how effective it is, but I would like him to say something about the preparations the Mission is making for the arrival and deployment of the UAS, so that the system can be used to best effect when it is eventually deployed in a few months' time.

I was also struck by the General's reference to innovative disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and reconciliation and-reintegration efforts such as using loudspeakers attached to helicopters. I understand that that has been used to some effect in the fight against the Lord's Resistance Army in the Central African Republic, and wondered if that was a technique — not high-tech, by any means, in fact rather old-tech, but nonetheless one that can be quite effective in getting the messages out from the United Nations peacekeeping missions — that the General thinks might have a role to play.

I would like to thank Major General Ngondi very much for his briefing, the focus of which was the in-mission assessment of pre-deployment training, but I wonder whether he thinks that it would be useful to have a validation of that training before the deployment and after the training, as it were. Obviously, as we say in English, the proof of the pudding is in the eating, but it would nonetheless be useful if there was some validation of the preparatory training before peacekeepers were actually put into the field.

Major General Iqbal Asi talked a good deal about inter-mission cooperation being a crisis and contingency tool, but I wonder whether in fact it could be used more widely than that. Clearly there has been quite a lot of support consolidation around Entebbe and Brindisi, and so forth, in support of peacekeeping missions. But I wonder, given that most missions already have joint operations centres and joint mission analysis centres, whether these can be used on a more regular basis to share information, particularly in adjacent missions, rather than waiting for the crises to hit.

In that respect, I would ask Mr. Ladsous if, with respect to some of the constraints that General Iqbal Asi referred to, in terms of inter-mission cooperation, which we understand, as well as the legal and political aspects, consultations, host Government consent and so on, there is more than the Department of Peacekeeping Operations can do to address some of those constraints.

Finally, I would pose a question to all four briefers, building on the question of the UASes and recognizing that they have not yet been deployed in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Given that we have the two Force Commanders in another theatre where there is a lot of enthusiasm by the host Governments, in Liberia and in Côte d'Ivoire, for the use of UASes in that theatre, in theory, at least, do they see some advantages in the deployment of UASes in that West

African theatre or, more generally, in peacekeeping areas where the mission or the mandate is very broad, the territory very widespread and resources, obviously, constrained?

I shall now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.

I give the floor to Mr. Ladsous to decide if he wishes to respond to any of the questions raised. I hope that he will. He may wish to pass on to the Force Commanders any questions that are more appropriate for them.

Mr. Ladsous: Mr. President, I wish, through you, to thank the entire Council for a discussion that has been very substantial and that certainly helps us all. Indeed, many questions were asked of the three Generals and of at least two other Force Commanders. Allow me at the outset to make a general comment.

The meeting of the heads of military components this year we have placed under the general theme of what is a constant concern and theme of work for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and that is the issue of performance: how to cultivate it and how to enhance it. That is true in the field of training. As the Council is aware, and some delegations have mentioned, we have been working intensively on manuals for a number of specialties, and more are on the way. I thank those Member States that are helping us in doing that work, but certainly those basic considerations — what an infantry battalion should look like, what a field hospital should look like — have to be complemented by actual training, with such training ideally being done before the deployment, but also on the ground.

Here I very much take the point that there is a need for very specific training, for instance in the areas of women's issues and child-protection issues. That cannot always be achieved before deployment. That is what we are going to do mainly in Mali once the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) takes over from the African-led international support mission for Mali (AFISMA). All the main training focused on human rights issues, women's issues and children's issues in Mali will be handled on the ground; quality control, of course, has to be constantly kept in mind.

We are working on — and this is curently being debated in the Fifth Committee — the proposal for the post of a director of evaluation of field uniformed personnel. Once again I thank those delegations that mentioned their support for that initiative, which I hope will materialize and which will be an institution attached to the Under-Secretary-General, working very closely with all the Force Commanders to solve the systemic issues that arise time and again.

Performance is also very much enhanced by inter-mission cooperation. Within the limits we have all agreed on, it cannot be a procedure used systematically to circumvent the regular ceiling of staff, regular funding or regular equipment. It is about addressing surges, either surges that are well identified in advance, such as election processes, or unexpected ones. Over the recent period, three clusters among our operations have appeared. One is in West Africa, where the cooperation between our missions is exceptionally good, because it is also anchored in cooperation between the Governments concerned; I refer here to Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. There must be appropriate mechanisms and therefore suppleness has to be introduced.

Yes, I can confirm that this same process that I am seeing in West Africa is being used to the benefit of MINUSMA in Mali in terms of staff and equipment. I think that this is also an opportunity to thank the Force Commanders for their willingness and understanding and for their actual deliberate participation in making it work.

The second cluster is focused mainly on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan, and there it is mainly about equipment and helicopters — attack helicopters and utility helicopters. These, as the Council is aware, are a very scarce commodity, and we are led regularly to exchange rotary-wing machines among the four main missions concerned.

The third, and not least, geographical area is that of the Middle East missions where, especially since last year, when we deployed the United Nations Supervision Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic, there has been absolutely exemplary cooperation among the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, and, let us not forget, with the support of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, which is more often than not a backup to those three missions. I think that there is much to be said, but in terms of personnel and equipment, it works in a rather exemplary way.

Let me finish by saying a word about the new technologies, first about the unmanned aerial vehicles in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We are in the middle of the procurement process, which, as the Council is aware, is not a simple process, but it is very much under way. It is my hope that before long, probably not in July, though, those unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) will be flying in the skies above the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They will be doing what they are intended to do, which is three things.

First, give the best information possible to the Force Commander.

Secondly, they will give better protection to our people on the ground and, let us not forget, to the civilian populations, including the camps for internally displaced persons that the General mentioned. I think that is a major tool for enhancing the safety and security of all those concerned.

Thirdly, but not least, they will serve to deter the ruffians or miscreants, or whatever one might call them, who will know that there is an eye in the sky watching everything they are doing, with our Force Commander and his staff being fully aware of what is happening. That also serves a great purpose; we do know that some of the armed groups in a particular region of the Kivus are quite concerned that this is going to happen, and it does, I think, fit well in the picture.

Concerning other technologies, I would perhaps hesitate to use the term "advanced technology", because mainly it is state of the art. UAVs are around in so many sectors and so many professions, and many of the items of equipment that Lieutenant General Dos Santos Cruz mentioned are indeed readily available in thousands of models. So it is about in fact bringing United Nations peacekeeping into the twenty-first century.

I think it is a very welcome initiative that Pakistan, as Chair of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, after having already engineered resolution 2086 (2013) earlier this year, which has served the Council well, will convene this meeting some time in July. I think it will be a very useful discussion because we simply need, again in the name of performance, to be able to use what is readily available to do the job within the parameters that have been expressed by a number of delegations.

I have one final remark to make with regard to unmanned aerial vehicles in other missions. Of course, I will want to be able to draw some initial lessons from the first few months of using those machines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but clearly there is a demand in several other missions and I think there is a need. We shall do that in an appropriate way in the sense that we will first want to learn our lessons and then see how we can best implement it elsewhere.

The President: I now give the floor to Lieutenant General Dos Santos Cruz.

Lieutenant General Dos Santos Cruz: I have many questions which basically concern the Force Intervention Brigade and unmanned aerial vehicles. The first training is fundamental, and during the training we may have much more basic technology because, for instance — and I will mention some details — with regard to night vision, it is very difficult to find some rebel groups or gangs with the equipment we have. If we have the new technology, we will have more night combat and that is much better for us. It is a great advantage.

There is a variety of technology, from basic to high tech. We need to know how to use it. At this moment, we are organizing our structure to receive the equipment. In New York, they are working on procurement and the final contract. I need to find specialized people to use the system in the best way. It is not complicated. Sometimes from Headquarters it seems very complex, but it is not. It is simple. I am sure that we are going to have good results in favour of our mandates. We are going to protect more civilians and better protect our people, and we are going to have much more information, not only for us, but for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Security Council and the United Nations as a whole. It will be very useful for everyone.

With regard to the Force Intervention Brigade, I came to the Democratic Republic of the Congo three weeks — less than one month — ago and it is my personal opinion that the mandate of 2098 (2013) is something new. It is the first time a more open and stronger position has been taken with a Force Intervention Brigade. That has generated much speculations and many interpretations. I do not see unanimous understanding about it. But, with regard to the situation at this moment with the Force Intervention Brigade, in Sake we have one battalion from Tanzania, one battalion from South Africa that just arrived last week, one special force company from Tanzania as

well, and we are waiting for the Malawians. We do not have exact information at the moment, but we hope they will be in place in late July.

The problem with the Force Intervention Brigade is that it entails greater expectations, here and on the ground. On the ground, the common citizen thinks that we are going to solve all the problems, even public security, but that is not true because one brigade will not solve that problem. We need to protect civilians to accomplish our mission with the 20,000 we have on the ground.

With regard to the question concerning the rules of engagement, in that environment it is not so easy to have a clear target because we have more than 50 armed groups. At this moment, we have only one in uniform and in a clear position, but we have some 56 groups in civilian dress within the population.

With regard to the rules of engagement, we need to understand that peacekeeping operations follow the same principles. Even with the new mandate, the Force Intervention Brigade and more freedom to operate, we are operating under the same principles. The use of force follows the same rules and the same principles. We do not have many ways to justify the use of force. Therefore, it is not a problem to employ the Intervention Brigade because all the troops, even the Intervention Brigade, need to follow the same principles and we have very clear guidelines to justify the use of force.

What may be of concern is artillery. Artillery is something new because normally we are not in an open field; rather we operate in very heavily populated areas. But we have the means to employ artillery. We have smoke grenades. We have ways to illuminate the battle field. We need to be very careful with explosive grenades. I have the staff and we follow the rules.

I sometimes see some sectors very concerned about the protection of civilians. The protection of civilians is the main task for everybody, even for us. The main conditionality in our plans is the protection of civilians. With regard to the Intervention Brigade, it is not a problem. We have the rules of engagement, we are very clear and it is not a problem.

There was one more question concerning how the Security Council can obtain more up-to-date information from the field. If we have more technology, certainly the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has the structure and will provide all the information because we are connected in real time. In that regard, it is not a problem. We are available in the missions for video-teleconferences and to respond to questions, and we do that daily for our commanders in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

I would like to make one more point with regard to the reference to the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda and the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC). The FARDC is the national armed force. Everybody knows that we have a complex situation. It is not a national problem. It is more regional and has regional consequences because the groups operate very close to the border and sometimes interfere throughout the region. But, with regard to that question, we have four mechanisms in place now. We have the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the Southern African Development Community, the African Union and the Peace and Security Council framework. With the guarantors, the Secretary-General and all of the countries around the lakes, we have very good prospects for being able to deal with any problem.

From the military point of view, the protection of civilians is our primary concern, and we treat all threats against the population equally.

The President: I now give the floor to Major General Ngondi.

Major General Ngondi: I wish to say how humbled I am and thankful for all the kind comments and gratitude expressed to our troops, which I promise I will pass on.

I addressed the need for in-mission assessment of pre-deployment training conducted and administered by troop-contributing countries. To make my point clear, the gap that exists in force headquarters — and not necessarily mine alone, but all force headquarters — is in the ability of the Commander to understand or know the standard of operational readiness of the troops because he or she does not have the capacity to check that standard.

The performance of the troops basically involves three areas: the ability to conduct essential mission tasks which are well covered and documented, the staff functions, and the sustenance of the contingents. If a Force Commander is in a position to know that all of those areas are going well, then he or she can be confident when it comes to detailing the troops to undertake various tasks.

With regard to the question of whether such evaluation should be carried out even before troops deploy, I would say yes. It would be even better if, before the troops deployed to the mission area, their training could be validated to establish, in particular for the Force Commander, that they are ready for operations. However, I addressed this topic only within my area of responsibility.

With regard to the issue of which criteria should be used, let me say that as of today there are manuals and documents, and more continue to be produced; they are shared between the United Nations and troop-contributing countries, including guides on what pre-deployment training activities should be provided. Those same activities are to be applied in the field. Where new trends and challenges emerge, the new component I have called an "evolution team" will be on hand to analyse what is going on and formulate appropriate training plans and directives to ensure that troops received appropriate training within the mission to deal with an emerging situation. We cannot wait for them to go back to their countries to be trained there. There should be an opportunity to train troops to address emerging issues; otherwise such emerging issues could throw the mission off completely.

I also wanted to respond to the question regarding what the United Nations can do to end the cycle of violence. I do not know who should be responsible, but my own view is that, in my own experience, violent conflict is the result of exclusion within a country. Therefore, if it is possible to focus on the need to create inclusive political and economic institutions within the country, where everyone feels a sense of ownership and enjoys the fruits of the country, then perhaps we will see the end of such cycles of violence. But as long as extractive and non-inclusive institutions exist within a country, it is just a matter of time until grievances will grow into violence. That is my opinion.

The President: I now give the floor to Major General Iqbal Asi.

Major General Iqbal Asi: At the outset, I wish to thank all of representatives for their very kind remarks and expressions of support for troops in the field. Questions were asked with regard to three areas, including inter-mission cooperation, my subject. Secondly, there was one question regarding cooperation between United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire? And thirdly, I will make a short comment on training based on my experience in the field. I will handle the questions in reverse order.

A joint analysis centre, covering two or more missions, is very much a possibility and, in fact, desirable. But to achieve that, we must first agree that there has to be a regional approach to conflict management by the United Nations, a common threat perception and a common mechanism for initiating responses. These things have to be agreed upon first. There could be no better examples than those provided by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. The three Missions are so contiguous that resources can be placed centrally and utilized in all of the Missions. We have to work at that. In the light of the continuing implications of the current financial crunch, we should seriously consider such options. They are bound to be useful.

The representative of the Republic of Korea mentioned that troop transfers should be dealt with carefully. I could not agree with him more, but I have also spoken about status-of-forces agreements, status-of-mission agreements and memorandums of understanding. We need to formalize this practice for proper sanction. Without that, such transfers will not be possible.

The representative mentioned that there was no movement of troops between UNOCI and UNMIL. I would just like to make the clarification that troops have moved twice — three companies in 2010 and one company in 2011, which was significant. We have definitely utilized helicopters more than once for security and reconnaissance sorties, which was useful.

The representative of the United States spoke about inter-mission cooperation viability. There is no doubt that such cooperation is an extremely viable option. The only issue is the need to sort out the approach to conflict resolution taken by the United Nations.

I would also like to deal with the training question that was raised. Regarding training gaps among troops working in the field, my opinion is that such gaps will continue to exist, and we will not be able to remove them on a permanent basis. That is not possible. The military contingents come from very different national backgrounds. There are very wide gaps in their training

standards. We cannot do much about that, although we must try to reduce these gaps as far as possible.

However, it is my personal observation that the collective attitude of the contingent and the ability of the battalion commander and the officers to inspire performance make all the difference on the ground. If that can be done — if somehow or other the national authorities and the local commanders on the ground can make that much difference — I am sure that troops' performance in the field will improve.

In response to the representative of Rwanda, inter-mission cooperation as a short-term solution cannot replace a permanent solution. I agree that there is absolutely no doubt about that, but a permanent solution needs resources. We actually talk in the context of a lack of resources. A lack of resources can be dealt with only by multiplying resources through the use of those available in other missions. That is how one can take care of the shortage of resources that we are experiencing in the field in one form or another.

The representative of Azerbaijan spoke about particular logical and administrative problems in inter-mission cooperation. There is no doubt about it. These problems are there, but we have the mechanisms of status-of-forces agreements, status-of-mission agreements and memorandums of understanding, of which I have already spoken. We can reduce or even eliminate these problems through this legal framework.

The representative of Luxembourg asked about the creation of border-control units. There is no doubt that they can be very useful, but they have to be subordinated to the inter-mission cooperation framework. We have to agree that this framework is acceptable to all of us in all missions around the globe before we can think of establishing border-control units, although this too will not be without its challenges. Who controls and commands the battalion? Where is the battalion deployed? What are the terms of reference of operation of this battalion across different missions? All that will have to be sorted out.

I now come to some of the more challenging questions. The French and Australian representatives had questions regarding inter-mission cooperation within the context of Mali. I remember that when the crisis in Mali started, I was in the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). We actually started working the logistics support part ourselves, without any clear direction from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, because we thought that a mission in Mali would certainly require some initial support from UNOCI to help it settle in, because there was such natural logistical support available from Côte d'Ivoire. We have broad infrastructure; we just brought it to Bamako and there was no problem.

That support is there; it is very possible. There is the use of helicopters. I have learned here that the MI-24s are being transferred to UNOCI. That is very much the central point of the three missions in Côte d'Ivoire, Mali and Liberia. We may have to work out some of the logistical aspects of refuelling in-between, but otherwise operationally there should be no problem. I think this should be pursued.

As to a central quick reaction force, there is force available that is placed centrally, maybe somewhere in northern Côte d'Ivoire. This force is available to react anywhere. Again, some of the teething aspects will have to be sorted out in the memorandums of understanding, the status-of-forces agreements or the status-of-mission agreements in order to ensure that it works out smoothly. The use of technology, again, is one of those areas of cooperation that I believe to be feasible.

Finally, I come to the most challenging question, which came from the representative of Pakistan. What are the challenges in inter-mission cooperation? I covered that particular issue in my presentation. There were three things that I spoke about in terms of challenges: legal and administrative challenges, restrictive mission mandates, and the non-availability of standard means. The last two are important, but the most difficult challenge is the legal, political and administrative part. What number of troops is acceptable to a particular country? What types of weapon are acceptable to a particular troop-contributing country? Is a country politically prepared to move into the mission area or not? Is it acceptable to that country or not? Maybe they are neighbours; maybe in a regional context they are not ready to operate in a certain country. As to contingent-owned equipment, the United Nations wants a certain standard and a certain type of weapon, whether that country has it or not. What are the capabilities? Some of these things will have to be sorted out. This is a real challenge.

But I should like to digress a little bit here. There is one more very important challenge to which I alluded earlier. That is regionalizing our approach to conflict

resolution. I was talking with my colleague, the Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in Liberia. We are neighbours. Day in and day out, we are sorting out some of our problems in Sector West along the border. He is on the other side and I am on mine. Although we talk regularly to each other on the telephone and meet, and I always thought our understanding of some of our issues was really common and we had no problem, but having talked with him here, I realize how differently he thinks of his own problems than I do of mine.

A mission has a certain identity, and one develops sympathy with that identity. One develops sympathy with the local authorities. They have their own respective points of view on different issues. Until such time that we regionalize this entire concept, bring people together and discuss these things jointly, we will not be able to develop a commonality of views on this. That is important, and although I did not cover it in my statement, I think it is the most important challenge.

The last question was from the representative of Togo, concerning cooperation between UNOCI and the Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI). I assure the representative of Togo that such cooperation is wide-ranging. It is in the field of operations, training, logistics, and security operations. I have 29 different bases that I occupy throughout all of Côte d'Ivoire. From those bases, I initiate patrolling all over the country. FRCI has about eight major bases that I know of. We complement one another. Wherever it is not possible for them to dominate the area, my troops dominate that area. This is actually what I would call complementarity in operations to dominate the area.

There is joint patrolling. Whenever there is a problem, we run to assist them, even in terms of information-sharing. We conduct training on a regular basis. My force has conducted more than one session. In fact, the Mission on its own is also conducting training for FRCI troops. Our logistics support is phenomenal. We have provided transport on more than one occasion since I took over responsibility for the force. We have even allowed commanders to use helicopters.

As I mentioned in my statement, we have provided security in elections to different voting centres and regional offices throughout the country. My entire force was deployed as recently as April. I am sure the Council received numerous reports on that. It was a very successful operation. We provide security to strategic sites. By the end of last year, the spoilers were attacking strategic sites after the FRCI found it very difficult to defend some of those sites, which were very important to them. So we moved in and provided security to 11 sites. We are continuously providing security there to VIPs.

For my last point, we are starting a partnership project with the FRCI. I have a lot to say on this, but I am constrained by time. It is a major project, and we look forward to enhancing the capacity of the FRCI in a big way if the project gets through somehow or the other.

The President: In order to wrap up the meeting, I now give the floor to General Gaye, in case any questions went to other Force Commanders or to the Office of Military Affairs.

Major General Gaye (*spoke in French*): There were in fact two questions addressed to other Force Commanders.

The first had to do with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. The concept of operations for the Mission consists of increasing the relative size of the force by mobilizing reserve battalions. That mobility must be guided by an awareness of the situation. Situational awareness is therefore crucial to the Mission. Following the crisis in December 2011, it was the observations made from helicopters that made it possible to alert Government authorities that confrontations among the various communities were about to take place in Jonglei. It was our action — the very swift response by the Force Commander on the ground to shift some troops — that made it possible to keep the violence, which unfortunately nevertheless took place, to a minimum. The Mission in South Sudan is an emblematic case of where good knowledge of the situation using modern technology makes it possible to make maximum use of reserves, as well as to react to deploy battalions.

The second question, concering the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), had to do with the strengths and weaknesses of the support we provide to humanitarian actors. Mandates usually give a force responsibility for ensuring the security of humanitarian actors and United Nations personnel. It is up to the various Deputy Special Representatives of the missions to coordinate the efforts of all humanitarian actors and to ensure that they support the force. In the specific instance of MINUSTAH, it was possible, following the earthquake, to significantly boost an

engineering company. MINUSTAH is genuinely a very interesting laboratory of what a military engineering company can do in a post-conflict country. For all that that company was able to accomplish, however, we must nevertheless admit that, for several reasons, we are still unsatisfied.

First, to be of most use, an engineering company must be deployed on the basis of planning. Engineering companies do not work on the basis of a couple of days; they prefer to work on a long-term basis and by deploying their its assets. That is why MINUSTAH has established a quaraterly meeting to deal with the planning and coordination of engineering unites. It was the Department of Peacekeeping Operations that encouraged the Mission to do so, and they did so quite well.

We are also unsatisfied because, even with all that planning, the use of engineering units entails significant financial implications. Having the ability to build a road out of asphalt nevertheless requires that you crush the stone and so forth. At a time of financial constraints, we certainly do not have an answer to that problem.

Nevertheless, the issue of engineering units is one that clearly illustrates the link between a mission and all the humanitarian actors involved in benefitting the population.

With regard to the regional aspect, on which General Iqbal Asi place great emphasis, I would like to confirm that that is indeed an aspect that touches on many of the Council's mandates. In particular with regard to the Lord's Resistance Army, we have asked the missions to cooperate. That has led to a trend of regular quarterly meetings among the forces. In some regions that works well, while it functions less so owing to the situation. With regard to Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, as the Council is aware, there is a meeting between the two countries and the two missions. That four-way meeting illustrates the fact that there is a trend to address the refugee issue on a regional basis. I am sure that Mr. Koenders, who is at the centre of such efforts, will lead the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali in the same direction very soon.

The President: I thank General Gaye for his answers. I would also like to thank the other Force Commanders for being present and for contributing to today's discussion, which I think was extremely useful for all Council members.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.6988

Security Council

Sixty-eighth year

Provisional

6988th meeting
Wednesday, 26 June 2013, 3 p.m.
New York

President:	Sir Mark Lyall Grant	(United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
Members:	Argentina	Mr. Stancanelli
	Australia	Ms. King
	Azerbaijan	Mr. Sharifov
	China	Mr. Shen Bo
	France	Mr. Araud
	Guatemala	Mr. Rosenthal
	Luxembourg	Ms. Lucas
	Morocco	Mr. Loulichki
	Pakistan	Mr. Tarar
	Republic of Korea	Mr. Kim Sook
	Russian Federation	Mr. Iliichev
	Rwanda	Mr. Nduhungirehe
	Togo	Mr. M'Beou
	United States of America	Mr. DeLaurentis

Agenda

Peace and security in Africa

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sahel region (S/2013/354)

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-506.

13-37415 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Peace and security in Africa

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sahel region (S/2013/354)

The President: Under rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite His Excellency Mr. Romano Prodi, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel, to participate in this meeting.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

I give the floor to Mr. Prodi.

Mr. Prodi: I am very grateful for the opportunity to brief the Security Council for the second time and to present the report of the Secretary-General on the Sahel (S/2013/354). My appointment as Special Envoy in October was made in recognition of the need to focus on the Sahel as a region and on a strategy that is therefore a strategy for a region, in order to help the people and Governments of the region to sustain peace, security and development in the short and long run.

As I mentioned in my last briefing to the Council, in December 2012 (see S/PV.6882), the challenges facing the peoples of the Sahel are immense, and only a strategy that goes beyond existing efforts will allow the Governments of the region to overcome them. The ongoing efforts in the Sahel remain critical, and enhanced coordination between them is essential. But, in all honesty, I must say that a strategy that only enhances coordination between the current efforts is not sufficient. A wider vision is necessary; hence my vision of a four-by-four strategy based on the four pillars suggested by the Secretary-General — governance, security, humanitarian requirements and development — as articulated when I was appointed, with a request for areas of cooperation between the Governments of the region, the international community, among the peoples of the Sahel and, finally, within the United Nations system. I believe that four-by-four strategy should be the foundation of a collective response to the challenges of the region, and all of us must therefore be engaged in it.

I have had considerable consultations with the leaders of the Governments of the region as well as with key interlocutors of the international community, in bilateral meetings as well as in multilateral forums on the Sahel. During my visits to the region, I have met with representatives of civil society and traditional tribal, religious and women leaders. As far as coordination within the United Nations system is concerned, I have coordinated closely with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the Office for West Africa, Mr. Said Djinnit, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Côte d'Ivoire, Mr. Albert Gerard Koenders, as well as with the former and current Regional Humanitarian Coordinators, Mr. David Gressly and Mr. Robert Piper. The annex to the report highlights the division of labour within the United Nations system.

Within a broader concept, I felt there has been a need to act with urgency from the very outset, while planning for the long run. Urgency is needed not only because of the gravity of the situation, but also to harness global support for the Sahel, as it will not last forever. I am afraid that, with all the problems around the world, if we do not act immediately the problem of the Sahel will take second place. The unanimous international concern over the spread of terrorism in the Sahel has provided me with an opportunity to gain support for the peoples of the region, both for the short and for the long terms. Of course, all of that was triggered by the crisis in Mali.

The situation in Mali is clearly seen by all to be symptomatic of what will happen in other parts of the Sahel if a timely response is not generated to the challenges facing the entire Sahel region. While the timely intervention of France has preserved the territorial integrity of the country and prevented a takeover of Mali by extremists and terrorists, it is now critical that the success be followed by a credible and all-inclusive political dialogue that addresses the genuine problems of all communities in the country.

I am mentioning Mali early on in my brief for two reasons. First, success or failure in Mali will affect the entire Sahel, and secondly, while focus and attention on Mali are critical, they should not be at the cost of the rest of the region. In other words, when we talk about Mali we must never forget the Sahel.

The strategy focuses on five key Sahelian countries in the greatest need. I have taken into consideration Mali, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, the Niger and Chad. As far as the implementation of the strategy is concerned,

it requires an innovative approach that clearly shows the peoples of the Sahel that it is no longer business as usual for us. In that regard, I firmly believe that we should focus on peace and security in the Sahel.

Let me now elaborate that point further. When it comes to the region's humanitarian requirements, I believe that the humanitarian efforts under way in the region represent a success story — truly, I have never seen such a fantastic effort — and are being well coordinated under the regional coordinator. I have met the resident coordinators of the region twice, listened to them, and made it clear to them that I stand ready to help in any capacity that they feel can enhance their efforts or remove any impediments they face.

The Sahel undoubtedly suffers from a myriad of governance and security challenges. I have taken a careful look at the situation and the actors and the challenges faced or created by them. In the light of the foregoing, I strongly believe that the development pillar — development that empowers Sahelians to take care of the Sahel themselves — will provide the best opportunity to improve peace and security. There is a need to formulate concrete regional development priorities with short-term impacts, in close collaboration with the Governments of the region, while laying the foundation for sustainable long-term development. That must be followed, of course, by requisite resource mobilization through an innovative coordination mechanism that is capable of progress monitoring.

We know that success in all of this will be contingent upon progress on good governance, and I am confident that it will happen. In that respect, greater efforts on cooperation and on commitments to good governance and security will foster a greater scope of development.

I think it is very appropriate that I am briefing the Council before the start of the implementation phase. In line with the principle of empowering the Sahelians in defining solutions to their problems, a second seminar, as a follow-up to the first one of March 2013, was held on 14 June. It was similarly attended by experts from the region and academics working on the Sahel issue.

We are in the process of formulating the recommendations of the seminar into concrete, specific, quick-impact regional projects aimed at laying a foundation for long-term structural change in the region. Once finalized and after consultations with the relevant United Nations actors — including the United Nations Development Programme — have taken place, we intend to take the project to the regional Governments for discussion, endorsement and commitments to participate in implementing bottom-up strategies aimed at obtaining concrete results.

Resource mobilization for the project will be the next critical phase. Any one can choose how to contribute to that. Accordingly, resource mobilization will demand a more innovative approach. It will require a mechanism that is flexible enough to receive any form of assistance, in cash or in kind, by directly delivering the object of their choice. It will enable us to act quickly; most importantly, it will have a low operational cost so that most of the assistance can be expended in the Sahel. In view of these criteria, I am recommending the setting-up of a Sahel action fund that will act as a platform for the resources necessary to meet the needs of the Sahel, which will be defined through the regional development projects.

As I stated, donors will be free to choose the type of assistance they wish to offer, and the peoples of the Sahel will know the source of the assistance. In that regard, I have begun consultations with the African Development Bank. I have already met representatives of the World Bank, and tomorrow I will meet the President of the World Bank, in order to explore the possibility of the two Banks co-managing the fund, with support from a pool of other international financial institutions, including the Islamic Development Bank, the European Investment Bank, and others, each of which has already expressed an interest in participating in the effort. At the same time, a coordination mechanism will be needed to monitor progress and to ensure that no resources are wasted due to duplication of efforts.

It is an innovative process. The development proposal has come from Sahel University, with the support of the United Nations. The proposal will become the development plan, after approval by the Governments of the countries of the Sahel. The main sectors addressed will be water and agriculture, new energy sources, decentralized solar energy, transportation infrastructure, and infrastructure for hospitals and schools.

An action fund platform is to be established and managed by a pool of international development institutions and coordinated by the World Bank and the African Development Bank; a coordination mechanism will be established among the United Nations, banks and donors to monitor the process.

I would like also to clarify that the resource mobilization will be in addition to the assistance required for the ongoing humanitarian development activities of the United Nations in the region. I call upon the donor community to maintain its assistance to that critical project.

Finally, taking into account the necessity to bring about long-term sustainability by enabling the peoples and Governments of the Sahel, I have recommended the establishment of a Sahel development research institute, because the people will have to work together, which they have never done. They have worked in Paris and elsewhere, but never together. The research institute will be funded through the Sahel action fund. The institute will be located in the region. It will constitute a very light administrative and management structure and will act as a training facility to generate local expertise in issues confronting the Sahel. We will request the donor community to second experts on specific issues, as in-kind assistance, to form the faculty and substantive body of the institute.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate two messages. First, we cannot forget the Sahel, or we will have more Malis; secondly, I appeal to the international community to be as generous to the Sahel as it has been towards Mali.

The President: I thank Mr. Prodi for his briefing.

I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.

The meeting rose at 3.20 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.6989

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 June 2013

Original: English

Official communiqué of the 6989th (closed) meeting of the Security Council

Held in private at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 27 June 2013, at 10 a.m.

In accordance with rule 55 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the following communiqué was issued through the Secretary-General in place of a verbatim record:

"On 27 June 2013, the Security Council, pursuant to annex II, sections A and B of resolution 1353 (2001), held its 6989th meeting in private with the troop- and police-contributing countries to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan.

"The Security Council and the troop- and police-contributing countries heard briefings under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure by Mr. Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and Major General Delali Johnson Sakyi, Force Commander of United Nations Mission in South Sudan.

"Members of the Council, Mr. Mulet, Major General Sakyi and representatives of participating contributing countries had an exchange of views."

13-37689 (E) 270613

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United Nations S/PV.6990

Security Council

Sixty-eighth year

Provisional

6990th meeting
Thursday, 27 June 2013, 11 a.m.
New York

President:	Sir Mark Lyall Grant	(United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
Members:	Argentina	Mr. Oyarzábal
	Australia	Mr. Bliss
	Azerbaijan	Mr. Sharifov
	China	Mr. Wang Min
	France	Mr. Bertoux
	Guatemala	Mr. Rosenthal
	Luxembourg	Ms. Lucas
	Morocco	Mr. Achgalou
	Pakistan	Mr. Tarar
	Republic of Korea	Mr. Kim Sook
	Russian Federation	Mr. Iliichev
	Rwanda	Mr. Nduhungirehe
	Togo	Mr. Kadangha-Bariki
	United States of America	Mrs. DiCarlo

Agenda

The situation between Iraq and Kuwait

Thirty-fifth report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1284 (1999) (S/2013/357)

Letter dated 12 June 2013 from the Permanent Representatives of Iraq and Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2013/358)

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-506.

13-37599 (E)

Accessible document

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The meeting was called to order at 11.05 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation between Iraq and Kuwait

Thirty-fifth report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1284 (1999) (S/2013/357)

Letter dated 12 June 2013 from the Permanent Representatives of Iraq and Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2013/358)

The President: Under rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of Iraq to participate in this meeting.

On behalf of the Council, I welcome the presence at the Council table of His Excellency Mr. Hoshyar Zebari, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

Members of the Council have before them document S/2013/379, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by Australia, France, Morocco, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2013/357, which contains the thirty-fifth report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1284 (1999), and to document S/2013/358, which contains a letter dated 12 June 2013 from the Permanent Representatives of Kuwait and Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.

It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, China, France, Guatemala, Luxembourg, Morocco, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Togo, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America

The President: There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 2107 (2013).

I now give the floor to Mr. Zebari.

Mr. Zebari (Iraq) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, allow me to thank you, Sir, for convening this important meeting and to express my appreciation to the countries that sponsored resolution 2107 (2013) and contributed to its enrichment, and to the friendly the members of the Security Council that voted on adopting it.

I cannot but express my Government's gratitude to the Secretary-General for his report contained in document S/2013/357, which contains important proposals and evaluations, and to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), led by Special Representative of the Secretary General Martin Kobler, for its efforts to fulfil the requirements of its mandate in Iraq, as well to the State and Government of Kuwait for their support and assistance to Iraq in emerging from under the provisions of Chapter VII. I also wish to express our gratitude and appreciation to the late Ambassador Vorontsov and Mr. Tarasov, the high-level coordinators, for their efforts to achieve progress in the humanitarian files of missing Kuwaiti persons and property.

The Security Council meets today to adopt a resolution in the context of resolutions and measures taken by the Council to remove Iraq from the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. When we carefully consider the past few years, we can see how far Iraq has come along the path of constructive cooperation with the objective of enabling Iraq to finally fulfil all its obligations under Security Council resolutions. Our foreign policy and international relations have been focused mainly on how to free the people and country of Iraq of the burdens of those resolutions. Those burdens would never have been imposed on Iraq had it not been for the aggressive policies of the former regime of waging wars against its neighbours and internally against its own people. Those resolutions have hindered Iraq's progress, prosperity and integration into the regional and international communities.

Looking back at what we have achieved over the past few years towards Iraq regaining the international standing it enjoyed prior to resolution 661 (1990), we note the crucial resolution 1762 (2007), which ended the mandate of the United Nations Commission on

Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission. The resolution strengthened the sovereignty of Iraq, lifted the weight of political constraints from its shoulders, paved the way for Iraq's return to the regional and international communities, and contributed to the stability of the region.

Resolution 1762 (2007) represented the international community's recognition of the correct approach taken by Iraq in fulfilling its obligations in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. It is with great pride that Iraq currently chairs the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, which confirms the validity of the path Iraq has taken, particularly after the ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Furthermore, in resolution 1859 (2008), the Council decided to review the resolutions concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait and the situation in Iraq in order to identify together the mutual obligations falling to the international community, represented by the Council, and to Iraq. As a result, the Council adopted three important resolutions on 15 December 2010 — resolutions 1956 (2010), 1957 (2010) and 1958 (2010) — under which all of Iraq's obligations were ended, with the exception of three issues relating to the situation between Iraq and Kuwait: missing Kuwaitis and property, the maintenance of the border, and compensation.

With regard to the first issue, significant progress has been achieved under bilateral cooperation between the two countries. None of that cooperation could have been achieved without the serious cooperation of the Iraqi authorities. We shall continue to cooperate and to step up the pace of our cooperation in the near future, now that the issue has been transferred to coverage under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter.

With respect to the maintenance of border markers, Iraq and Kuwait have created a mechanism through the establishment of a joint ministerial committee, and put in place the necessary measures indicated in resolution 833 (1993). In that regard, I refer to the letter of the Secretary-General to President of the Security Council dated of 12 June 2013 (S/2013/358), which refers to the end of the mission entrusted to him under resolution 833 (1993). Therefore, on this basis, Iraq has fulfilled all its obligations under that resolution.

As for the issue of compensation, Iraq is committed to paying the percentage decided by the Security Council based on the mechanism set out by the United Nations Commission on Compensation, as cited in resolution 1956 (2010) under the mechanism of the successor arrangements for the Development Fund for Iraq. We therefore believe that, through the adoption of resolution 2107 (2013), Iraq has fulfilled all its obligations under the resolutions of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter.

We believe that today's date, 27 June 2013, would be a milestone in the history of the relationship between Iraq and the international community, indicating that the resolutions imposed on Iraq under Chapter VII of the Charter now belong to the past. This date will also represent a significant development in the relationship between Iraq and Kuwait. All the negative aspects of the relationship between the two countries are now bygone, and we will focus on the present, on the future, and on what brotherly relations can achieve to consolidate peace, security and stability in the region. We shall focus on directing the efforts of these two rich countries to promote sustainable development that reflects positive results on both countries and the Arab region. The achieved cooperation between Iraq and Kuwait will serve as a model for resolving disputes between States by peaceful means.

Iraq is a rich country, possessing wealth and human, material and natural resources that qualify to play an important, indeed critical role in ensuring the stability of the Middle East. Although these capabilities have been affected by the challenges to our internal political process, the war on terrorism, and regional political changes, all Iraqi parties involved in the political process are united in their resolve to confront these challenges through a national partnership that prioritizes national interests above all else and benefits the stability of the region. All Iraqi parties will work to secure social peace and to prevent Iraq from returning to sectarian fighting. We will resort to our Constitution to resolve our issues and to the polls to choose our representatives in the provincial councils and the Government.

In the recent past, we have already held successful provincial elections, and will convene the upcoming legislative elections by adhering to the same principles that we have upheld in previous elections, which were characterized by transparency and integrity and monitored by the international community. This will result in a Government elected by the people that leads

a democratic, federal Iraq to progress, security and stability and contributes to the security of the region.

Having discharged all the requirements of the international community, we still face two main challenges. First and foremost, we must win the war on terrorism and defeat religious extremism, which we cannot do without national efforts and international cooperation, because terrorism has assumed a cross-border, global dimension and cannot be defeated without international cooperation.

The second challenge is reconstructing Iraq in such a way that guarantees sustainable development for future generations. This, too, will be difficult to achieve without a peaceful environment and international assistance. We therefore look to the international community for its assistance in order to achieve our goals.

In conclusion, we reiterate our gratitude and appreciation to the Security Council. Iraq will continue to cooperate with international organizations, the United Nations first and foremost, and to make such cooperation the foundation of our foreign policy and international relations. As a responsible and fully sovereign country, Iraq has regained to its natural place in the international community. It will play a positive and constructive role in promoting peace and stability and in achieving development for its people and the region. Just as Iraq was the cradle of civilization, it will be the cradle of cooperation, peace and fraternity for its people, its neighbours and the world.

From this international forum, I congratulate the people of Iraq on the great achievements of the current and previous Governments in freeing our country from the burden of sanctions and embargoes, and on their efforts to achieve prosperity and security.

The President: The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.

United Nations S/PV.6991

Security Council

Sixty-eighth year

Provisional

6991st meeting
Thursday, 27 June 2013, 11.20 a.m.
New York

President:	Sir Mark Lyall Grant	(United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
Members:	Argentina	Mr. Oyarzábal
	Australia	Mr. Bliss
	Azerbaijan	Mr. Sharifov
	China	Mr. Wang Min
	France	Mr. Bertoux
	Guatemala	Mr. Rosenthal
	Luxembourg	Ms. Lucas
	Morocco	Mr. Loulichki
	Pakistan	Mr. Munir
	Republic of Korea	Mr. Kim Sook
	Russian Federation	Mr. Iliichev
	Rwanda	Mr. Nduhungirehe
	Togo	Mr. Kadangha-Bariki
	United States of America	Mrs. DiCarlo

Agenda

The situation in the Middle East

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) for the Period from 1 April 2013 to 30 June 2013 (S/2013/345)

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-506.

13-37605 (E)

Accessible document

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The meeting was called to order at 11.20 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Middle East

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for the period from 1 April to 30 June 2013 (S/2013/345)

The President: The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

Members of the Council have before them document S/2013/376, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by Australia, France, Luxembourg, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2013/345, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for the period from 1 April to 30 June 2013.

It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, China, France, Guatemala, Luxembourg, Morocco, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Togo, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America

The President: There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 2108 (2013).

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.

United Nations S/PV.6992

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 June 2013

Original: English

Official communiqué of the 6992nd (closed) meeting of the Security Council

Held in private at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 27 June 2013, at 3 p.m.

In accordance with rule 55 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the following communiqué was issued through the Secretary-General in place of a verbatim record:

"At its 6992nd meeting, held in private on 27 June 2013, the Security Council considered the item entitled 'Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2010/507)'.

"The President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Armenia, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Mozambique, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, the Syrian Arab Republic, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Viet Nam, Zimbabwe and Yemen to participate in the consideration of the item without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

"In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, the President, with the consent of the Council, extended invitations under rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure to the representatives of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations and the African Union to the United Nations.

"In accordance with the provisional rules of procedure and the previous practice in this regard, the President, with the consent of the Council, extended an invitation to the representative of the Observer State of the Holy See to the United Nations, to participate in this meeting.

"The members of the Council had an exchange of views."

13-37753 (E) 280613

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